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Summary 
Donor countries have a poor track record of meeting their foreign aid commitments. 
Yet the discrepancy between aid commitments and actual delivery of aid has received 
little scholarly attention. Traditionally, studies of aid allocation have assumed that do-
nors provide an amount of aid that they deem satisfactory. In this thesis, I explore the 
possibility that the current lower-than-promised quantities of aid may be unsatisfactory 
for donor countries, i.e., that they would prefer an alternative state of the world with 
higher aid levels. Specifically, I consider how strategic interaction can lead donors to 
give less aid than they would ideally prefer.  
 Using game theory, I find two main reasons for why a donor may give less aid 
than it would ideally prefer: 1) a donor may only want to provide aid on the condition 
of certain behavior by the recipient. If the donor believes or experiences that the recip-
ient does not conform to this behavior, the donor may restrict aid even though it would 
ideally prefer to give more; 2) donors may see aid as a contribution to a public good, 
and be tempted to free ride on the efforts of each other. If the voluntary production of 
the good is Pareto suboptimal and effective enforcement mechanisms are absent, the 
resulting quantity of aid is unsatisfactory for the donor countries.    
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 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1. Objective 
Following the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the Monter-
rey Consensus on financing for development was established in 2002. As part of this 
consensus, all developed countries pledged to contribute 0.7 percent of gross national 
income (GNI) to official development assistance (ODA)—the 0.7 target.1   
Despite the promises, only five countries currently meet the 0.7 target;
2
 on av-
erage, high-income countries contribute only 0.47 percent of GNI to ODA. In real 
terms, the shortfall adds up to over 150 billion dollars (DAC 2010b). In 2004, Jan Ege-
land, then UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, chose these words 
to characterize the aid efforts of most donor countries: 
 
―[T]he foreign assistance of many countries now is 0.1 or 0.2 percent of the 
gross national income, I think that is stingy, really, […] I don't think that is 
very generous‖ (CNN 2004). 
   
This thesis is about why donor countries do not deliver on their aid quantity commit-
ments. 
 
1.2. Research question 
Why do donors not honor their aid commitments? One explanation is that donors may 
not actually want to fulfill their aid promises, i.e., that they are happy with the status 
quo of moderate quantities of aid. In this view, lofty aid goals are merely window 
dressing, and not a reflection of actual preferences. This seems to be the default expla-
nation for the lack of compliance with aid targets (see section 1.3).   
                                              
1
 To be precise they agreed on making ―concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 percent of Gross 
National Product (GNP) as ODA‖ (UN 2002: 14). Gross National Product (GNP) is equivalent to Gross National 
Income (GNI), bar a few technicalities. Today, the convention is to use GNI. For a more thorough discussion of 
the 0.7 target, see section 2.4.1.  
2
These are Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway. The numbers for 2010 are not in yet, 
but it looks like Belgium might join the group of countries that meet the 0.7 target this year (EU 2010: 16). 
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Another, perhaps more interesting possibility is that donors see the current situ-
ation as unsatisfactory, i.e., that they would prefer an alternative state of the world 
with higher aid levels. In this thesis, I explore the possibility that not meeting aid 
commitments may be undesirable for donor countries. My research question is as fol-
lows:
 
 
 
How can the current situation with lower-than-promised levels of aid be unsatisfactory 
for donor countries? 
 
1.3. Literature review 
The literature on donor behavior has primarily been concerned with why donors give 
aid, and to whom. The discrepancy between the promises and the actions of donor 
countries has received little scholarly attention. To my knowledge, no existing studies 
consider systematically how donors view own and other donors‘ lack of compliance 
with aid commitments. In this section, I review the existing literature on donor behav-
ior and find that it lends support to the notion that moderate levels of aid is a satisfac-
tory outcome for most donors. 
Broadly speaking, research on donor behavior consists of a theoretical and an 
empirical branch. Within the empirical branch, large-N statistical studies have mostly 
focused on how donors allocate a pre-determined quantity of aid (e.g Alesina & Dollar 
2000; McGillivray 2003; Berthèlemy 2005), and—to a much lesser degree—on what 
determines aid efforts (e.g Round & Odedokun 2004). Case studies of individual do-
nors have usually considered what factors shape particular aid policies (e.g Hoebink & 
Stokke 2005). In all, the empirical branch offers little guidance as to how donors view 
the state of affairs regarding aid quantities.  
Theoretical research on donor behavior has primarily been concerned with the 
motivation for giving aid. These studies are more relevant to this thesis as they provide 
a framework for understanding how donors view foreign aid. In this section, I review 
the theoretical literature on donor behavior and contrast it with empirical findings. The 
results are summarized in sub-section 1.3.3.  
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1.3.1 Why give? – The theoretical foundations of foreign aid 
Why do states provide aid to other states? According to Cato Seiglie (1999: 207) ―[t]he 
main objectives for providing foreign aid […] have been: 1) strategic, 2) economic and 
3) humanitarian‖. It is important to note that most donors are motivated by a mixture 
of these objectives, although the ―the particular mix [differs], often sharply, between 
donors‖ (Riddell 2007: 92). 
We begin with strategic motivation. It is often claimed that aid is widely used 
by donors to pursue political objectives (e.g. Sogge 2002; Tarp & Hjertholm 2000). 
Stephen Browne (2006) even argues that aid is a proxy of a new form of imperialism. 
In this view, foreign aid is primarily a foreign policy tool. 
How can foreign aid promote national interests? One of the first to provide a 
comprehensive framework for understanding aid as a policy instrument was Hans 
Morgenthau. In his article A Political Theory of Foreign Aid (1962), he distinguishes 
between three ways foreign aid can pay strategic dividends.  
First, aid can be in the form of military assistance to allies, the benefits of which 
are obvious. Second, the transfer of foreign aid can be an elaborate form of bribery, 
with which the donor buys political advantage from the recipient. Finally, aid can take 
the form of prestige aid; designed to enhance the standing of both the donor and the 
recipient on the international scene (Morgenthau 1962: 301-304).  
If the strategic potential of foreign aid is obvious, the economic motivation is 
less clear. The standard economic model of aid is a transfer of welfare from one agent 
to another, entailing a net loss of welfare for the donor and a net gain for the recipient. 
In other words, the donor is worse off and the recipient is better off after the transfer. 
This is clearly a good deal for the recipient, but one is left wondering ―why the donor 
should ever make such a transfer‖ (Kanbur 2006: 1569). 
Economists have identified several mechanisms that can improve the economic 
outcome for donors (Kanbur 2006: 1570-72). Economic spillover effects are one ex-
ample. In an interdependent world, both positive and negative externalities can have 
far-reaching consequences. Presumably, aid can foster the first kind while preventing 
the other. Another possibility is the tying of aid in order to boost certain sectors of the 
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donor‘s own economy. Tied aid can only be used to buy certain types of products, and 
exclusively products from the donor country. In effect, aid tying is ―a way of redistr 
ibuting income within the donor country‖ (Kanbur 2006: 1572). However, foreign aid 
is hardly a lucrative investment. Although aid can prevent negative spillover effects 
and aid tying can remedy the loss of donor welfare, the pure economic incentives to 
provide aid seem small. 
The final type of motivation to consider is altruism, i.e., that the increased well-
being of the recipient in itself motivates donors to give aid. It is often assumed that 
altruism is part of the rationale for giving aid. In his influential book Moral Vision in 
International Politics, David Lumsdaine (1993: 3) argues that foreign aid is a ―re-
sponse to world poverty which arose mainly from ethical and humane concerns‖. As 
he points out, the concept of foreign aid was virtually nonexistent before 1949, and 
altruism is the only reasonable explanation of why states suddenly started giving away 
financial resources to other countries—often through international institutions over 
which they had little influence. Thus, the assumption that altruism can form part of a 
donor‘s utility function is not unrealistic. 
The theoretical literature on donor motivation allows for some conclusions. 
First, of the three kinds of motivation considered, economic motivation seems to offer 
the weakest incentives to give aid. If aid budgets were decided on economic grounds 
alone, they could very well be non-existent. Second, there are several possible strate-
gic uses for aid. Consequently, a good deal of foreign aid can be expected to be given 
to promote national interests of various kinds. Finally, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that at least some aid is motivated by altruism. 
 
1.3.2 To whom to give? – The allocation of foreign aid 
Based on the theoretical discussion in the previous sub-section, we can expect aid to 
be allocated primarily out of strategic and altruistic concerns. The exact mixture of 
these two types of motivation will likely vary from donor to donor. In this sub-section, 
I look at how motivation influences donor behavior; in particular, how it affects a do-
nor‘s generosity.  
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Who would be more generous—a strategic or an altruistic donor? Clearly, a 
purely altruistic donor would have very strong incentives to provide aid (assuming that 
aid increases the utility of the recipient). The generosity of a strategic donor, on the 
other hand, would depend on to what degree foreign aid is an effective tool for pro-
moting national interests.  
The efficacy of strategic aid  
The efficacy of foreign aid as a policy instrument depends on both the situation at 
hand and the donor‘s underlying strategic goals. As an example of both the merits and 
shortcomings of strategic aid, consider the case of Japan. 
In the 1980s, Japan aspired to become an ―aid great power‖, relying on aid to 
achieve foreign policy goals. Reviewing this approach, Yasutomo (1989: 500) con-
cluded that aid had been an ―effective diplomatic tool‖ for Japan, and that it had 
played a major part in restoring Japans position in Asia. A more recent assessment, 
however, modifies the picture by pointing to the failures of containing the military ex-
penditures of China and North Korea, two of the biggest recipients of Japanese aid 
(Kuramoto 2007: 21). 
In general, studies have found mixed support for the claim that aid is an effec-
tive foreign policy tool. However, evidence suggests aid is good for achieving certain 
objectives. Palmer et al. (2002) claim that aid is most useful for change-seeking pur-
poses; a notion that fits nicely with Japans success at re-branding itself in Asia. One 
particular topic that has received much attention is whether foreign aid can buy UN 
votes. Examining UN voting records, Dreher et al. (2008: 157) find that ―US aid has 
indeed bought voting compliance‖, but they do not find this pattern with other G7 
countries. 
In sum, although foreign aid is, to some degree, a ―weapon in the political ar-
mory of the nation‖ (Morgenthau 1962: 309) it is uncertain how effective a weapon it 
is. It seems reasonable to expect that, other things being equal, the more emphasis a 
donor places on strategic gains from foreign aid the weaker its incentives to give aid 
will be, compared with donors who are motivated by altruism.  
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Strategic vs. altruistic motivation I: Generosity 
Donor generosity is an understudied phenomenon. To my (and their) knowledge, only 
Round and Odedokun (2004) have undertaken a comprehensive, cross-national study 
of what determines aid effort. They do find a link between altruism and aid efforts: 
donors with ―pro-poor‖ domestic policies and egalitarian income distributions tend to 
be more generous (measured as ODA percentage of GNI) than other donors (Round & 
Odedokun 2004: 307).  
Another way of assessing the theoretical expectation that altruism increases 
generosity is to use aid allocation as a proxy for motivation. One could expect an altru-
istic donor to give aid based on need, while strategically motivated donors could be 
expected to prioritize recipients within their ―sphere of influence‖, for instance neigh-
bors or political and military allies. We can then check if donor countries with an altru-
istic allocation pattern differ from donors with a strategic allocation pattern when it 
comes to aid effort.  
In Table 1.1, 14 countries are classified according to how they allocate their aid. 
Countries that target their aid chiefly to poverty reduction are labeled altruistic. Con-
versely, countries that primarily use aid as a tool for achieving other objectives are 
labeled strategic. Finally, the group of countries with an ambiguous allocation pattern 
is labeled mixed. The classification is based on an overview of studies of aid allocation 
given by Riddell (2007: 96-98). I have only included countries that have received 
enough scholarly attention to be classified. 
Table 1.1 shows that the three groups differ markedly in generosity. On aver-
age, altruistic donors have an ODA/GNI ratio of .77, while the corresponding number 
for donors motivated by strategic interests is .22; a difference of .54 percentage points. 
This result, like the findings of Round & Odedokun (2004), provides some support for 
the stylized notion that altruism increases generosity. 
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Table 1.1: Donor motivation and generosity 
Strategic vs. altruistic motivation II: Proliferation 
Are most donors strategic or altruistic? All donors display elements of both strategic 
and altruistic motivation in their aid giving. Since the end of the Cold War, the balance 
has probably shifted in the favor of altruistic motivation. However, in general, it is not 
controversial to argue that ―the underlying rationale of using aid to promote donor 
countries' strategic interests is still very much alive. Instead of allocating their aid 
based on where it is most needed, rich countries often favor recipients that are of direct 
political or economic interest to them‖ (Hirvonen 2005). 
In fact, in a highly influential study, Alesina and Dollar (2000: 55-56), conclude 
that all the major donors generally base their aid allocation on strategic interests. This 
conclusion has later been modified, especially by McGillivray (2003) and Berthélemy 
(2005), but the impression that foreign aid is first and foremost a tool for promoting 
national interests still stands (see Riddell 2007: 94,98). 
 
1.3.3 Are moderate levels of aid satisfactory for donor countries? 
The existing literature on donor behavior leaves us with three general conclusions. 
First, donors can have both strategic and altruistic motivations for giving aid. Second, 
donors that are motivated primarily by altruism are generally more generous than do-
nors that emphasize strategic gains. Third, strategic motivation is more prolific than 
altruistic motivation. 
These findings indicate that low quantities of aid may be a satisfactory outcome 
for most donors. In this view, donors may say they want to provide more aid, but that 
does not reflect their actual preferences. A logical continuation is that if donors were 
 Altruistic Mixed Strategic 
ODA/GNI ratio .77 .33 .23 
 
Altruistic: Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Finland. 
Mixed: The UK, Portugal, Spain, Belgium and Canada 
Strategic: The US, Japan, Australia and New Zealand 
Source: DAC 2010b. 
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more altruistic, then actual delivery of aid would be more in line with the promises 
made.  
Lack of altruism is often identified as the main obstacle to raising aid levels. 
When John W. McArthur, manager of the UN Millennium Poject, pleads rich coun-
tries to ―contribute their fair share‖ (McArthur 2005), or when Nobel laureate Jeffery 
Sachs demands that the United States act on their ―obligations to the world‖ (Sachs 
2004: 127), the underlying idea seems to be that if rich countries were less self-
interested, they would give more aid. 
The contribution of this thesis is to explore the possibility that low levels of aid 
might be an unsatisfactory outcome for donors. A novel thing about this approach is 
that it shifts the focus from agent to structure by considering how the circumstances in 
which the donors operate might reduce aid flows, instead of focusing solely on proper-
ties of the donors themselves.  
 
1.4. Research design 
I use game theory to address my research question. This approach differs from the 
conventional way of studying donor behavior that has tended—through either statisti-
cal models or case studies— to focus on the determinants of donor preferences. In 
game theory, the preferences of the agents are determined exogenously. Instead, the 
focus is on outcomes; how a given outcome relates to other possible outcomes and 
how it came to be realized. 
Broadly speaking, I have made two important methodological choices: (i) to 
formalize the analysis and (ii) to use game theory. In this section, I briefly discuss the-
se choices. 
 
1.4.1 Formal modeling 
As a tool for analyzing social phenomena, formal models exhibit certain distinct char-
acteristics. Most notable are their rigid demands on precision. A formal model states 
the relationship between the various components of a situation in mathematical form, 
allowing us to draw clear and unambiguous conclusions (Snidal 2004: 228).  
Andreas H. Hvidsten  Aid Commitments and Strategic Behavior 
9 
  
Obviously, explaining or predicting human behavior can never be done with 
mathematical precision. Hence, formal models have limited explanatory power in the 
study of, for instance, politics. However, they are excellent tools for theoretical en-
quiry as they demand the researcher to be precise and make his or her assumptions 
explicit (Snidal 2004: 231-237).  
My motivation for formalizing the analysis is based on the nature of the re-
search question. First, the aim of this thesis is to develop an argument about donor be-
havior. In this endeavor, clarity and logical consistency are crucial, to which ends for-
malization is a useful tool (Hovi & Rasch 1996: 96). Second, comparing possible out-
comes is essential for addressing the research question. Formalized models are good 
instruments for doing counterfactual analysis of this kind in a systematic fashion 
(Snidal 2004: 237). 
A common criticism of formal models is that they are ―unrealistic‖. However, 
all models are unrealistic in the sense that they do not offer a complete description of 
the part of reality under consideration. In the social sciences, simplification is not only 
unavoidable, but also, to some degree, desirable (Hovi & Rasch 1996: 110). A better 
criterion to judge models by is whether they contribute to the understanding of the 
phenomenon at hand. The real danger is that formalization becomes an end in itself, 
and mathematical elegance displaces substantive interpretation as the main focus 
(Hovi & Rasch 1996: 100-101). Throughout this thesis I consistently use empirical 
examples to show how the formal analysis relates to the real world. 
 
1.4.2 Game theory 
Game theory is a theory of interaction between rational actors (Hovi 2008: 11). Hence, 
game-theoretic models are appropriate in cases where ―each actor‘s pursuit of her 
goals depends on the behavior of others‖ (Milner 2004: 270). In effect, the use of 
game theory is an assumption that interaction is important in the situation under con-
sideration. In the case of donor behavior, this assumption may not always be valid.  
In some cases, it is obvious that donor behavior is influenced by strategic inter-
action, most notably with a recipient country. However, in other situations, looking at 
donor decisions as strategic choices is not unproblematic. One such case considered in 
Andreas H. Hvidsten   Introduction 
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this thesis is the determination of the size of the aid budget (see chapter 4, section 4.2 
for a discussion). 
 The motivation for using game theory in this thesis is twofold. First, game theo-
ry offers a fresh analytical perspective on situations that have largely been analyzed 
with other tools. Second, game-theoretic models are very useful for comparing and 
explaining how possible outcomes can be realized, i.e., sustained as an equilibrium. By 
modeling behavior both on and off the equilibrium path, such models can give us an 
idea of under which conditions different end states will materialize.  
General assumptions 
In game theory, it is common to make several underlying assumptions. First, game-
theoretic models almost always assume that the agents involved are rational. The exact 
meaning of rationality is somewhat debated (see Hovi 2008: 17-21). However, simply 
put: ―[t]he rationality assumption holds that actors pursue their goals efficiently with 
the options available to them‖ (Snidal 2004: 247).  
It is important to note that ―the goals‖ are always to maximize own utility. In-
tuitively it would seem that only selfish actors would fit this criterion. However, ra-
tionality places no requirements on the utility function, which can consist of both self-
ish and unselfish interests (Hovi 2008: 17-21). The rationality assumption simply pro-
hibits actors from taking actions that go against their own interests, whatever they 
might be. 
The rationality assumption is a substantive assumption about human behavior, 
and as such it has clear shortcomings. First, as Jon Elster (1989: 28) points out: ―irra-
tionality is quite widespread‖. Second, maximizing utility is clearly not the only driv-
ing force behind social conduct. Thus, the rationality assumption should not be inter-
preted as a complete account of human behavior.  Nonetheless, assuming rationality is 
a fruitful point of departure for studying social phenomenon. After all, it is not unrea-
sonable to assume that most people act rationally most of the time (Hovi 2008: 20).  
Another common assumption is that of unitary actors. In the models presented 
in this thesis, the agents are states.
3
 Since states are complex organizations—consisting 
of many individuals with different and often contradictory beliefs and interests—
                                              
3
 One exception: in chapter 5, I model a game between a state and a regime. 
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treating them as unitary is problematic. Nonetheless, assuming that states are unitary 
actors is common in models of international relations. Unlike the rationality assump-
tion, the unity assumption is made solely to simplify the analysis. As Scott Barrett 
(2003: 54) notes: ―This assumption [that states are unitary actors] is made purely for 
reasons of convenience. It is an assumption that we know is untrue‖. Something is 
surely lost with this assumption, but the gain is models that are much easier to inter-
pret.  
Finally, it is usually assumed that all players have common knowledge of the 
structure and the rules of the game, and the rationality of the other players (Gates & 
Humes 1997: 9). Once again, this assumption is made more for analytical convenience 
than for representing an accurate description of the actors.   
Aid games 
Generally speaking, a game consists of five elements: (i) a set of players, (i) a set of 
available actions for each player, (iii) a set of possible outcomes, (iv) a characteriza-
tion (payoff) of each outcome for each player, and (v) the rules of the game (Hovi 
1998: 44).  
The first task is to identify the players. Generally speaking, there are two types 
of agents on the international aid scene: donor states and recipient states.
4
 Thus, a do-
nor‘s decision concerning the quantity of aid to provide may be influenced by (i) the 
actions of the recipient(s) or (ii) the actions of other donors.
5
 In this thesis, I look at 
two types of aid games: donor-recipient games and donor-donor games. 
Outcomes, payoffs, and the rules of the game—including the sequence of 
moves and the information available to each player when making a decision—vary 
across the games in this thesis. However, they do have one common feature. Since 
both donors and recipients are sovereign states, I assume that they are unable to make 
binding commitments to each other. Consequently, all the games in this thesis are non-
cooperative (Hovi 1998: 4). 
 
                                              
4
 I conveniently ignore the presence of NGOs, individuals and private companies. 
5
 A third possibility, that donor behavior may be influenced by the interaction between recipients will not be 
considered in this thesis. 
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1.5. Plan 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 looks at the development of the current 
international aid regime, with a special focus on trends in donor generosity. In particu-
lar, it reviews the track record of compliance with the international 0.7 target and the 
current state of affairs regarding aid levels.  
 Chapter 3 considers donor-recipient games. The main idea of this chapter is that 
a donor may want to give aid only on the condition of certain behavior from the recipi-
ent and that lack of compliance from the recipient can hinder the aid flow. In this 
chapter, I draw heavily on the rich literature on aid conditionality.   
Chapters 4 and 5 consider donor-donor games. In chapter 4, I present the argu-
ment that foreign aid can be seen as a public good, the quantity of which could be Pa-
reto suboptimal as long as donors contribute non-cooperatively. The first part of this 
argument, that foreign aid is a public good, goes back to Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). 
The conditions under which the provision of this good is Pareto suboptimal are novel 
to this thesis.   
In chapter 5, I look at how agreements between donors on raising aid levels can 
fail to induce compliance. Assuming that the ex ante quantity of aid is Pareto sub-
optimal (see chapter 4), failure to sustain compliance in such agreements represent an 
unsatisfactory outcome for donor countries. Scholars have paid scant attention to the 
strategic aspect of inter-donor aid treaties, but the rich literature on international coop-
eration in general (and environmental agreements in particular) provides a useful ana-
lytical framework. 
This thesis offers two main explanations of donor stinginess. With respect to aid 
commitments between donors and recipients, the models in chapter 3 should give an 
idea of when an otherwise willing donor will restrict aid to a recipient. With respect to 
international commitments to raise aid levels—such as the 0.7 target—the models in 
chapters 4 and 5 should illustrate how the structure of the aid regime, not only lack of 
altruism, can lead to lower-than-promised levels of aid. 
 Chapter 2 Empirical background 
 
2.1. Purpose and plan 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish key concepts such as ―foreign aid‖ and ―do-
nors‖, and to give an idea of the development of the international aid system. The 
chapter is divided into three parts. First, in sections 2.2 and 2.3, I consider exactly 
what constitutes foreign aid and donor states. The second part (section 2.4) presents a 
brief overview of the history of international cooperation on foreign aid, and tracks the 
origins of the 0.7 aid target. The last section is devoted to aid levels. In this section, I 
consider the seemingly self-contradicting development that aid quantities have risen 
while, at the same time, donors have become less generous. Finally, I discuss whether 
the 0.7 target has had any effect on donor behavior.  
 
2.2. What is foreign aid? 
Broadly defined, foreign aid consists of all resources, including loans at concessional 
rates, transferred by donors to recipients.
6
 This definition does not mention anything 
about who the donors and recipients are. In this thesis, I focus on official aid flowing 
from donor states to recipient states, either directly (bilateral aid) or through interna-
tional institutions (multilateral aid).
7
  
Due to the vagueness of the term foreign aid, more narrow definitions are usual-
ly applied in the official discourse on aid. The terms development aid and development 
assistance are widely employed expressions referring to the part of foreign aid that is 
devoted to development and increasing human welfare in poor countries; in other 
words, what most people would associate with aid (Riddell 2007: 17-18). The line be-
tween development assistance and other forms of foreign aid has been the focus of 
much debate. 
                                              
6
 In this thesis aid is used synonymously with foreign aid.  
7
 In particular, this delimitation excludes private charity and NGOs. 
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 Probably the most comprehensive effort to define what constitutes development 
aid has been undertaken by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Or-
ganization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Right from its con-
ception, DAC was concerned with how to separate development aid from other trans-
fers of resources in order to compare aid efforts across donor countries. It launched its 
first annual review of DAC Members´ Development Assistance Efforts and Policies in 
1962, but it was not until 1969 that the members agreed on the concept of Official De-
velopment Assistance (ODA) (Fuhrer 1994: 15, 21). 
  It would take another three years of debating before DAC settled on the defini-
tion of ODA that it still employs today. The definition sets certain criteria for a re-
source flow to be considered development assistance (see Box 2.1).  
 
Although this definition brought some orderliness to the measurement of aid flows, it 
is by no means uncontroversial. The main problem is that it is a purpose-based defini-
tion: resource flows are categorized as development assistance if their ―main objec-
tive‖ is promotion of economic development and welfare (Box 2.1). However, finding 
the main objective behind a transfer of resources is no easy task.  In theory this is to be 
decided by rigorous and objective evaluation by DAC, but official ODA figures from 
donors are seldom questioned (Riddell 2007: 21). 
 Throughout this thesis, I often use the terms ―aid‖ and ―foreign aid‖ synony-
mously with ODA as defined by OECD. However, I do not operate with any strict def-
inition of what constitutes foreign aid, and the term generally refers to all resources 
transferred through official channels from donor countries to recipient countries, re-
gardless of motivation and purpose.  
ODA consists of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by 
official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, 
each transaction of which meets the following test:  a) it is administered with the pro-
motion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective, and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 
25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent) (Fuhrer 1994: 24). 
 
 
Box 2.1: Definition of Official Development Assistance 
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2.3. Who gives foreign aid? 
The international aid system is a hotchpotch of organizations and actors that has de-
veloped ―incrementally, without evident systematic intent, over several devades‖ 
(Rogerson et al. 2004: 1). The result is a rather complex system: 
 
The international aid system consists of a loose aggregation of more than 
150 multilateral agencies, including the UN system agencies and the global 
and regional financial institutions […], 33 bilateral agencies which are 
members of OECD/DAC, at least 10 non-DAC governments providing sig-
nificant sums of ODA, and a growing number of vertical global funds (Bu-
rall et al. 2006: 4).  
 
Adding to the complexity is the fact that new donors are emerging—often without 
ending to be recipients. These include the new members of the European Union, 
emerging global powers such as the BRIC countries, and other countries that are dis-
covering aid as a foreign policy tool.
8
 Usually grouped together with the emerging do-
nors are traditional donors that are not members of the OECD, including a number of 
Arab states (Grimm et al. 2009: 9-11).  
The emerging donors are making their mark on the international aid scene. Chi-
na, in particular, has captured the attention by explicitly pursuing an aid policy based 
on non-interference and non-conditionality (Grimm et al. 2009: 19).  However, it is 
still the case that most aid is provided by ―Western‖ donors, meaning (primarily) the 
OECD/DAC countries, which account for roughly 90% of global aid flows (Grimm et 
al. 2009: 9). The key players in this group are the United States, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany. Together, these countries account for about 66% of 
all ODA provided by the DAC donors (Riddell 2007: 55).  
In this thesis, I mainly focus on donors within what has been labeled the ―West-
ern consensus‖.9 In particular, I focus on the members of OECD/DAC. In general, the 
DAC countries are what I have in mind when using generic expressions such as ―rich‖ 
and ―developed‖ countries.  
 
                                              
8
 The newness of some of the new donors can be debated. For instance, both India and China have had foreign 
aid programs for decades.  
9
 See appendix for a list of ―Western donors‖ 
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2.4. International cooperation on foreign aid 
Foreign aid is a relatively new concept, and usually recognized as a post-World War II 
phenomenon. The birth of modern foreign aid is popularly attributed to the Marshall 
Plan, through which the United States aided the recovery of a war torn Europe. How-
ever, this is a bit misguided. The Marshall Plan was certainly an extraordinary and un-
precedented undertaking, but governments had already been giving foreign aid for a 
long time at that point. 
  Riddell (2007: 25) argues that the most important aspect of the Marshall Plan 
was not the giving of aid per se, but how it was done: ―by donors pooling their re-
sources together, by coordinating their aid efforts, under the United Nations if possi-
ble; and by insuring that the aid given would enable recipients to use it in ways they 
saw fit‖. The Marshall Plan laid the groundwork for the institutionalizing of the inter-
national aid system; a process that gathered momentum in the 1950s. 
 In 1960, the United Nations declared the coming decade the ―First Development 
Decade‖ (Resolution 1710). The 1960s saw the rise of a host of international aid or-
ganizations, together with a rapidly increasing number of both donors and recipients. 
Foreign aid was becoming an enduring aspect of international relations, and increas-
ingly seen as a matter of international cooperation. More than any other event, the es-
tablishment of DAC was a formalization of the latter notion.  
DAC is an international forum for donor governments and multilateral organi-
zations, ―working to increase not only the quantity, but also the quality of aid‖ (DAC 
2010a). It was established in 1960 (then as DAG) to better coordinate the common aid 
efforts of the international donor community (Fuhrer 1994: 8-9).  
Improving the burden sharing of financing development was a working goal for 
DAC right from the start—and a subject of much debate. In order to settle on a con-
sensus, a comparative measure of donor generosity was needed. in 1969, the annual 
DAC Chairman’s Report published, for the first time, figures on ODA as percentage of 
gross national product (Fuhrer 1994: 21). This measure, popularly called the ―generos-
ity ratio‖, would later serve as the basis for the 0.7 target. 
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2.4.1 The 0.7 target 
Aid targets—goals for the quantity of aid donors should provide—is a recurrent theme 
in the history of foreign aid. Many, perhaps most, donors have set national aid targets 
in addition to the many international targets (see appendix). The overarching aid goal 
is the 0.7 target, which stipulates that developed countries should commit 0.7 percent 
of gross national income (GNI) to ODA.
10
 The 0.7 target was first adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 1970, and has later been reaffirmed a number of times. The most 
recent high-profile affirmation was at the 2002 International Conference on Financing 
for Development, which put the target in connection with achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
The origins of the 0.7 target go back to the dawn of international aid coopera-
tion. In 1958, the World Council of Churches, which coordinated aid efforts from par-
ishes in rich countries to parishes in poor countries, sent a statement to the United Na-
tions urging rich countries to devote at least 1 percent of national income to grants and 
loans to poor countries.
11
 It was favorably received, and in 1960 the UN General As-
sembly adopted the resolution that the total sum of capital flows from rich countries to 
poor countries (both official and private) should be increased to approximately 1 per-
cent of GNI (Clemens & Moss 2005: 4). 
With the total capital target of 1 percent established, there was still no consen-
sus on what percentage should be aid. Indeed, at this point there was still no consensus 
on what exactly constituted aid. The first steps towards an aid target were taken at the 
first two meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in 1964 and 1968. Both meetings produced background studies on the 
issue of aid percentage, and in the second meeting the secretariat proposed to adopt a 
goal of providing 0.75 % of GNP as foreign aid. The member states, however, were 
unable to agree on a number (Clemens & Moss 2005: 7). 
                                              
10
 What is meant by the term ―developed country‖ is far from clear as ―[t]here is no established convention for 
the designation of ―developed‖ and ―developing‖ countries or areas in the United Nations system‖ (UNSTAT 
2010). In common practice, Japan, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Western European countries 
are considered ―developed‖ (Ibid.). Being a full-fledged member of OECD/DAC, it is probably fair to add South 
Korea to this list as well. 
11
 The Council did not provide any record for how they arrived at the 1 % figure. It is more than likely that they 
simply chose a round number that represented about a doubling of the current capital flows (Clemens & Moss 
2005: 4).   
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The aid community, with the World Bank President, Robert McNamara, in 
front, wanted more. In order to ―rejuvenate the commitment to the UNCTAD target‖ 
(Ibid.), McNamara, together with the British Minister for Overseas Development, Lord 
Reginal Prentice, conceived the Pearson Commission. 
The establishment of the Pearson Commission is seen as a formative moment in 
foreign aid history. As Riddell (2007: 30) writes: ―the genre, style and approach of the 
Pearson Report […] set the tone for subsequent international reports on aid and devel-
opment‖.  In its report, the Commission was rather explicit about its agenda: 
 
What was basically required of the Commission at its creation just over a 
year ago was that it elaborate an aid strategy based on a convincing ra-
tionale, that could be used to attack effectively the wariness of will so in-
creasingly evident. For various reasons […] a number of the major donor 
countries were decreasing their foreign aid appropriations. In doing so, they 
were (and are) endangering the very viability of an international political 
idea that, until 1961, supported a rapidly increasing flow of concessional 
development finance from the richer to the poorer countries. (Excerpt of the 
Pearson Report (1969), WorldBank.org 2003). 
 
The conclusion was equally crisp: 
 
We therefore recommend that each aid-giver increase commitments of offi-
cial development assistance for net disbursements to reach 0.70 percent of 
its gross national product by 1975 or shortly thereafter, but in no case later 
than 1980 (Pearson et. al 1969: 148-149, cited in Clemens & Moss 2005: 8). 
 
The 0.7 target was born. The UN adopted the 0.7% figure (without a vote) at the decla-
ration of the Second Development Decade, in the General Assembly in 1970. It would 
be reiterated at the beginning of every subsequent decade in a slightly different word-
ing. The 0.7 target was also mentioned in UN declarations at the ―Earth Summit‖ in 
Rio de Janeiro (1992), the 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenha-
gen, and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg  
(Clemens & Moss 2005: 8). However, despite its long history, the 0.7 target is most 
famous for its connection with the Millennium Development Goals. 
 In 2000, ―the largest gathering of world leaders in history‖ (UN Millenium Pro-
ject 2006) adopted the UN Millennium Declaration that set eight global development 
targets to be reached before 2015, known as the Millennium Development Goals 
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(MDGs). It is an ambitious list of objectives that aim to address poverty in all its 
forms.  
 Two years later, in 2002, the UN International Conference for Financing for 
Development in Monterrey settled the matter of financing the MDGs, known as the 
Monterrey Consensus. The Monterrey Consensus deals with a long list of different 
sources of finance, including a strong emphasis on trade and foreign direct investment 
(UN 2002: 5-8). However, it is remembered, above all, for re-establishing the 0.7 tar-
get: ―we urge developed countries that have not done so to make concrete efforts to-
wards the target of 0.7 percent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing 
countries‖ (UN 2002: 9).  
  This statement of the 0.7 target is widely held to carry more weight than the 
previous declarations; in part due to the larger context of the MDGs, and in part be-
cause the conference was attended by more than 50 heads of state—unlike previous 
meetings where only UN representatives had been present (Clemens & Moss 2005: 9).  
The more low key follow-up conference on financing for development held in Doha in 
2008 reiterated the 0.7 target in the exact same wording (UN 2008: 12), as did the 
most recent UN summit on the MDGs held in 2010 (UN 2010: 29). 
 Whether these statements actually amount to a commitment to the 0.7 target is 
the subject of some debate. As Clemens & Moss (2005: 9) note: ―[it] is notable that 
none of the […] international statements on the 0.7% goal amount to promise to attain 
it‖.12 However, despite the weak wording, the 0.7 target has certainly taken on the 
characteristics of a real commitment, and rich countries are routinely criticized for not 
living up to it.  
 
2.5. A brief history of aid levels 
Have aid efforts risen or declined over the last fifty years? Commenting on the history 
of aid levels is not a straightforward undertaking. Aid efforts have both risen dramati-
cally and experienced an uneven but steady decline since 1960, depending on your 
measure of choice. Figure 2.1 illustrates the development for the DAC donors. 
                                              
12
 Several EU donors have made stronger commitments to the 0.7 target (see section 2.5.1). 
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Figure 2.1: Aid levels since 1960 measured in total volume (current prices) and as percent-
age of total GNI.  
Source: DAC 2010b 
 
The total volume of aid measured in nominal terms has increased dramatically while 
the generosity ratio (ODA as percentage of GNI) has fallen slowly in intervals until the 
end of the 1990s when it began a sluggish recovery. This illustrates two points about 
the development of foreign aid. First, the big increase in aid volumes tells us that aid 
has become an important part of international relations. There have been some periods 
of stagnation and decline—most notably in the 1990s—but the overall trend is a rapid 
expansion of aid volumes. 
 Second, even though the total volume of aid has risen, ODA as share of GNI 
has fallen from a high of 0.54 percent in 1961, to 0.31 percent in 2009. The fall has not 
been monotonous. A rapid decrease in the decade spanning from 1961 to 1971 was 
followed by a long period of stagnation that lasted until the 1990s, when it took a new 
plunge; reaching its lowest in 1997 when ODA constituted only 0.22 percent of GNI. 
A slow increase began at the turn of the millennium, and is still going on today.
13
  
 It seems that donors have been providing ever more aid, while at the same time 
becoming less generous. Figure 2.2 shows how the shortfall between the target amount 
of ODA—the amount that would have been given if the DAC countries delivered on 
                                              
13
 The dramatic peak in 2005 is a result of a big multilateral debt forgiveness that counts as ODA 
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their commitment to the 0.7 target—and the actual amount of ODA provided has risen 
since 1960. 
 The DAC donors were closest to reaching the 0.7 target in 1961, nine years be-
fore it was adopted in 1970. At that point, an increase of only 30 percent was needed. 
The DAC countries have never been this close again. During the 1990s, an increase of 
up to 200 percent would have been necessary. Currently, the DAC donors are 120 per-
cent short of reaching the 0.7 target. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The amount of ODA provided compared with the target amount of ODA (current 
prices).  
Source: DAC 2010b 
 
2.5.1 Has the 0.7 target had any effect? 
Figure 2.1 shows the trends that sparked the adoption of the 0.7 target in 1970. At the 
end of the 1960s there were distinct signs of donor weariness. The generosity ratio was 
falling steadily, and the growth in total aid volume had stagnated; the early enthusiasm 
for foreign aid was fading fast. 
 The 0.7 target was a response to these developments, but has it had any effect 
on aid efforts? It is difficult to assess. Although the 1970s saw a dramatic growth in 
total aid volume (from 1970 to 1980 it grew by a factor of 3.9), the generosity ratio 
never quite recovered to earlier levels. 
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 Aid levels seem to be correlated more with geopolitical events than with aid 
agreements. For instance, in the 1990s, the 0.7 target was reiterated three times—first 
in the General Assembly in 1990, then at the Earth Summit in 1992, and again at the 
World Summit in 1995—all without any measurable effect on falling aid levels. The 
decline in aid efforts in the 1990s is usually understood as a post-Cold War effect; 
there were simply less strategic uses for foreign aid (Riddell 2007: 38). 
 One could argue that the reiterations of the 0.7 target during the 1990s were too 
low-profile to have any effect on donor behavior, and that it was not until Monterrey 
that the aid target experienced a proper revival. This argument seems reasonable. Mon-
terrey, with its connection to the MDGs, created new momentum for the 0.7 target. In 
the period 2000-2004, the target was mentioned 584 times in the world‘s top 50 Eng-
lish-language newspapers. In contrast, the corresponding figure for 1980-84 was 45 
(Clemens & Moss 2005: 11). 
The effect looks tangible. The ODA/GNI ratio bounced back after Monterrey, 
and has risen steadily since. In the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development 
(the follow-up of Monterrey), the participants expressed encouragement by the fact 
that ―some donor countries have met or surpassed the ODA target‖, and that others had 
―established timetables for fulfilling their longstanding commitments‖ (UN 2008: 12). 
It confidently announced the ―recovery of ODA from its declining trend before the 
Monterrey Consensus‖ (Ibid.). 
It seems beyond question that Monterrey influenced aid efforts, but this effect is 
probably not as great as it appears on first inspection. First, the conference that pro-
duced the Monterrey Consensus took place in March 2002 and is unlikely to have had 
any effects on aid budgets before 2004,
14
 yet in 2002 the increase in aid levels was 
already well underway. This points to another culprit behind the revival of foreign aid, 
namely the comeback of political aid: 
 
[T]he most rapid increases in ODA did not begin to materialize until after 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on United States soil […] when 
aid-giving once again become more closely intertwined with wider political 
agendas (Riddell 2007: 39). 
 
                                              
14
 This is due to the fact that the aid budget for 2003 in most countries was already set at that point. In the US for 
instance, the President presented the budget for the next fiscal year in February. 
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Looking at where this new aid was directed gives an idea of how much of the rise in 
aid levels can be chalked up to geopolitics. Although total ODA to least developed 
countries (LDCs) increased by 300% from 2000 to 2008, a good deal of this increase 
was accounted for by Afghanistan which, in the same period, saw an surge in ODA of 
over 4500%. The case of Iraq is even more astonishing, from 2000 to 2008 the flow of 
ODA to the country increased by a factor of 116 (DAC 2010b). Thus, being invaded 
by the US seems like a better predicator of receiving aid than being poor. 
However, aggregate ODA statistics tell only one part of the story. The effects of 
Monterrey, and the 0.7 target in general, are more visible on a disaggregated level. The 
last part of this section traces the imprints of Monterrey on particular of donors. 
The European Union  
One of the more concrete effects of Monterrey is to be found among European Union-
donors. In 2005, following a European Commission-report on Translating the Monter-
rey Consensus into practice, the EU developing ministers laid out a road map for 
reaching the 0.7 target. In a much stronger wording than in the Monterrey Consensus, 
the EU set both a collective aid target (0.56 % of GNI by 2010) and group targets: 
0.7% of GNI for its high income members, and 0.33% of GNI for members that joined 
the EU after 2002 (EU 2006: 18).  
 In addition, several high-income EU states have unilaterally committed them-
selves to timetables for meeting the 0.7 target. Britain, France, Finland, Ireland, Bel-
gium and Spain are all set to reach it by 2015, while Germany, Italy and Portugal have 
made qualified commitments to do the same (Inter Press Service 2005). The question 
is of course if these promises have translated into action. 
 Concord, a NGO that monitors the EUs development efforts, shows a mixed 
picture in their most recent assessment. Several countries remain on track for reaching 
the interim 2010 target of 0.51%, including Belgium, Britain, and Finland. However, 
Germany, France, Portugal, Italy and Greece will all fall well short of the target. Spain 
is a curious case: it is slashing its aid budget (down by €285 million) but will still like-
ly reach its target due to a fall in GNI (Concord 2010a: 5). 
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 To sum up, Monterrey has played a part in making EU leaders set ambitious aid 
goals, and aid flows from the region are on the rise. However, it remains to be seen if 
these long-term commitments translate into actions. 
The United States 
The United States is by far the biggest donor on the international scene. If the DAC 
community is ever going to come close to the 0.7 target, the United States will have to 
bear its part of the burden. Collectively the DAC countries were $152 billion short of 
the target in 2009, of which $97 billion (47.1%) would have come from the US alone 
(DAC 2010b). 
 When it comes to the 0.7 target, the US has been reluctant to make binding 
commitments. Right from the beginning it has taken an ambivalent position on the is-
sue by being neither a proponent nor an opponent of the aid target. The official line, 
which has remained unchanged since the Nixon administration, is to ―support the prin-
ciple of a global aid target while at the same time […] not subscribe to any specific 
date for attaining it‖ (Clemens & Moss 2005: 10). 
 Thus, the 0.7 target seems to have had little effect on the aid efforts of the big-
gest donor. Variations in the US‘ generosity can for the most part be attributed to other 
factors than international aid agreements.
 
 
The G 0.7 
The clearest legacy of the 0.7 target is the G 0.7: the exclusive group of countries that 
meet the 0.7 target. It currently consists of five countries: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
15
  
Sweden and the Netherlands were the first countries to provide 0.7% of GNI to 
ODA, in 1975. They were joined by Norway in 1976 and by Denmark in 1978. After 
Denmark, it would take 22 years for another country to join the G 0.7, when Luxem-
bourg reached the target in 2000 (DAC 2010b). 
 Interestingly, no country that has reached the 0.7 target after it was adopted in 
1970 has let the ODA/GNI ratio fall back below 0.7%. This might very well be the 
biggest achievement of the 0.7 target: once a donor meets the target, it would be very 
noticeable if it suddenly failed to do so one year. This was not the case before 1970 
                                              
15
 Belgium might be joining this group in 2010. 
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when, for instance, France went from providing 1.36% of GNI as ODA (the still-
standing record) to 0.52% in less than a decade (Ibid.). 
 The establishment of the aid target has, to some degree, dichotomized aid ef-
forts and singled out a small exclusive group of ―generous‖ donors.  This has created 
an opportunity for countries to distinguish themselves. Many factors likely influence 
the decision by the G 0.7 countries to provide considerable amounts of foreign aid. 
However, the lure of standing out as ―generous‖ on the international scene created by 
the 0.7 target is no doubt one of them.  
 
2.6. Summary 
In this chapter, we have seen how the institutionalizing of international cooperation on 
foreign aid gathered momentum in the 1960s on a backdrop of increasing donor fa-
tigue. At the end of the decade, the donor community, led by the World Bank, sought 
to revive aid efforts by establishing an international aid goal. Followingly, the 0.7 tar-
get was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970. 
 The 0.7 target has since been the banner under which aid advocates of all kinds 
have rallied. Donor countries have generally been positive to the idea of attaining the 
target. Actually doing so, however, has eluded most of them. Has international cooper-
ation on foreign aid been a failure when it comes to increasing aid efforts? To some 
degree it obviously has. It seems that international aid agreements have not been overt-
ly effective in increasing aid levels, which remain at the mercy of geopolitics. But as 
this chapter argues, they have had at least some effect.  
 First, the adoption of the 0.7 target in 1970 probably influenced the Nether-
lands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway to increase their aid budgets over the ensuing 
decade and to keep aid efforts high. Similarly, it is not unlikely that the allure of the 
0.7 target also was a motivation for Luxembourg when it did the same in the years 
leading up to 2000. 
 Second, although the Monterrey Consensus has yet to produce any new mem-
bers to the G 0.7 it brought new public attention to the 0.7 target, which probably 
played a part in compelling EU donors to lay out a timetable for reaching it. If at least 
Andreas H. Hvidsten   Empirical background 
26 
 
some of the EU donors follow through on their commitments, Monterrey has certainly 
accomplished something.  
Still, rich countries are continuously failing to honor their aid promises, some-
thing which poses a question: why do donor countries keep reiterating aid targets and 
then fail to meet them? After all, for the majority of rich countries the existence of the 
0.7 target only serves to make themselves look bad. Could it be that aid targets are 
more than lip service, and that donors actually want to increase aid levels? The next 
chapters in this thesis consider how aid levels might fail to increase even if donors 
want to give more. 
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2.7. Appendix 
2.7.1 Donors 
Table 2.1: Donors that operate within the “Western consensus”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Group Donor ODA (in millions, 
$US) 
ODA/GNI 
 
DAC* Australia 2 761,0 0,29 
Austria 1 146.0 0,30 
Belgium 2 600,8 0,55 
Canada 4 012,5 0,30 
Denmark 2809,7 0,88 
Finland 1286,1 0,54 
France 12 430,9 0,46 
Germany 11 982,4 0,35 
Greece 607,4 0,19 
Ireland 1 000,1 0,54 
Italy 3 313,9 0,16 
Japan 9 480,1 0,18 
Luxembourg 402,7 1,01 
Netherlands 6 425,3 0,82 
New Zealand 312,6 0,29 
Norway 4 085,8 1,06 
Portugal 507,5 0,23 
Spain 6 570,8 0,46 
Sweden 4 546,1 1,12 
Switzerland 2 305,3 0,47 
United Kingdom 11 504,9 0,52 
United States 28 665,3 0,20 
Australia 2 761,0 0,29 
 
Non-DAC (EU) Malta 15,4 0,20 
Cyprus 40,6 0,17 
Slovak Republic 74,2 0,08 
Slovenia 71,4 0,15 
Lithuania 49,0 0,11 
Czech Republic 225,4 0,12 
Estonia 19,6 0,10 
Hungary 116,2 0,09 
Latvia 21,0 0,08 
Romania 138,6 0,08 
Poland 348,6 0,08 
Bulgaria 16,8 0,04 
*Excluding South Korea, for which there are no aid data 
yet. 
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2.7.2 Aid targets 
Table 2.2: Aid targets, success-rates and average generosity ratio for selected international 
donor groups 
Group ODA/GNI Target(s) Success-rate* Mean (ODA/GNI) 
DAC 0.7%  22% 0.47% 
EU 0.56% (collective target) - 0.45-0.46% 
EU-15 (pre-2004 EU member 
states) 
0.51% by 2010 60% 0.48% 
0.7% by 2015 Too early to tell 
EU-12 (EU member states 
that acceded after 2004) 
0.17% by 2010 16% 0.11% 
0.33% by 2015 Too early to tell 
* Percent of donors in the group that meet the target. 
Source: DAC 2010b; EU 2010. 
 Chapter 3 Donor-recipient games 
 
3.1. Purpose and plan
16
 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how circumstances pertaining to the donor-
recipient relationship can lead to lower quantities of aid than a donor would ideally 
prefer. The core question in this chapter is what can stop a donor that wants to pro-
mote development in a recipient country from giving aid? 
Two possibilities come to mind: the donor in question may believe a) that for-
eign aid does not promote development, or b) that foreign aid only promotes develop-
ment under certain circumstances, which are not present. If (a) is true, little or no aid is 
a satisfactory outcome for the donor. I briefly consider the arguments for (a) in section 
3.2. However, if (b) is true, the donor might prefer that the conditions for aid effec-
tiveness were present and more aid were given.  
 I consider one type of situation where (b) is true: when a donor wants to give 
aid on the condition of certain behavior of the recipient, and the recipient does not con-
form to this behavior. In section 3.3, I demonstrate how a conflict of interest regarding 
how to spend the aid money might lead to aid not being given, and how this could be 
an unsatisfactory outcome for both donor and recipient. In section 3.4, I add condition-
ality to the model. In theory, conditionality can solve underlying conflicts of interest in 
the donor-recipient relationship. However, in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, I demonstrate 
how conditionality failure can lead us back to the outcome where no aid is given. 
 In section 3.5, I consider the impact of incomplete information. Allowing for 
private information relaxes some of the conditions found in section 3.4, and opens up 
new possible equilibrium outcomes with unsatisfactory low quantities of aid. 
 
                                              
16
 The first part of this chapter is based on a paper originally written for the course STV4217, in spring 2010.   
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3.2. Does aid work? 
Does aid work? After decades of scrutiny, this question remains unsettled and the di-
vide between proponents and opponents of foreign aid is as deep as ever. The most aid 
critical argue that not only does aid not work—it is downright harmful. Dambisa 
Moyo, the author of Dead Aid (2009), does not pull her punches on the issue: 
 
Millions […] are poorer today because of aid; misery and poverty have not 
ended but have increased. Aid has been, and continues to be, an unmitigated 
political, economic, and humanitarian disaster for most parts of the develop-
ing world (Moyo 2009: xix). 
 
On the other end of the spectrum are aid proponents like Jeffrey Sachs (2005), who 
argues for increasing aid levels based on compelling evidence of its success. Why do 
we have such conflicting narratives?  
Part of the reason is that the impact of foreign aid is notoriously hard to meas-
ure. Moyo (2009: 46) claims that ―study, after study, after study […] have shown that 
[…] aid has had no appreciable impact on development‖, which is true (if you are a bit 
selective about your studies), but all aggregate evaluation of aid runs into several 
methodological difficulties.  
One such difficulty is that aid, even when narrowed down to ODA, is not ho-
mogenous. Some aid, for example, is given to governments, while other aid money 
finances local projects directly. Furthermore, some donors give aid on conditions—
anything from economic reforms to respect for indigenous rights—while others do not. 
In short, aid can be tailored to suit any taste. Since most of foreign aid is bilateral do-
nors are free to disperse it as they see fit, making it hard to compare aid across donors, 
or time. In the end, aid given by Norway is vastly different from aid given by the Unit-
ed States, or even by Norway, 20 years ago. 
Adding to the challenge is the question of how to measure development. In fact, 
there is no real consensus of what development really is. The only thing agreed upon is 
that it is a multidimensional, little understood, and apparently exceedingly complex 
process that depends on the interplay of numerous variables. Since measuring the im-
pact of aid on this process is challenging at the national level, doing a cross-country 
analysis seems overtly ambitious (Riddell 2007: 174). 
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 A case-by-case evaluation may be more appropriate, but it does not settle the 
question does aid work? There are plenty of successes and horror stories to choose 
from for both opponents and proponents of foreign aid (for examples see Temple 
2010: 4418). This implies that we may be asking the wrong question: 
 
Does aid work? The problem with this question can be seen by analogy. 
Nobody asks whether medical science work, because the question invites an 
answer – yes and no – that is correct but uninformative. A more interesting 
question is: when does aid work? (Temple 2010: 4419).   
 
Even a fierce aid critic as Moyo (2009: 76) grants that ―aid programs that are actually 
designed to address […] critical problems […] can deliver some economic value‖. 
Hence, we can assume with some confidence that aid can work under the right circum-
stances. This has implications for understanding why donors can be reluctant to in-
crease their aid budgets. 
Let us make the (not entirely unreasonable) assumption that donor countries 
want to promote development in recipient countries. Increasing aid flows may not be 
the most efficient way of promoting development if the conditions for aid efficiency 
are not present. Obviously, the exact conditions for any given aid transfer to promote 
development will vary from case to case. In this chapter, I consider situations where 
the behavior of the recipient government is the impediment to the aid flow.  
 
3.3. Conflict of interest: The basic condition 
The relationship between a donor and a recipient is usually understood in principal-
agent terms: the donor (principal) transfers resources to the recipient (agent) so that the 
recipient can accomplish the donor‘s objective (Paul 2006: 5). If the donor and the re-
cipient do not agree on means and ends, this could hinder the aid flow. 
To get a formal sense of the problem, consider a game with two players: Donor 
and Recipient.
17
 Assume that the objective of Donor is to increase the welfare of the 
poor in the recipient country. Furthermore, assume that in order to increase the welfare 
                                              
17
 Both Donor and Recipient are governments of states, but the discussion in this thesis is not necessarily valid 
only for intergovernmental relationships. One could easily imagine instances where Donor or Recipient is a 
NGO, or even a private person. 
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of the poor, the influx of aid money needs to be followed by tough reforms on the part 
of Recipient that it would rather do without.
18
 The game is depicted in Figure 3.1.
19
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The basic donor-recipient game with conflicting interests 
 
In this game, Donor wants to provide aid, but only if Recipient carries out certain re-
forms. Recipient cannot be trusted to do this, however, since upon receiving the money 
it would prefer to take it without the pain of reforming. Since it is a game of complete 
information, Donor knows this and does not give aid at the first stage.  
We can prove this formally by solving for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Us-
ing backward induction (as done in the paragraph above) we see that only ―not give 
aid‖, leading to the ―no aid‖ outcome (   ), is a Nash equilibrium in both subgames. 
This outcome is Pareto suboptimal, as both parties would prefer to give aid and carry 
out the reforms to this outcome.  
                                              
18
 The important thing is not what the donor wants (in this case increasing the welfare of the poor), or what is 
needed to achieve it (in this case tough reforms). The means and ends can really be anything as long the donor 
and the recipient disagree on them.  
19
 This game is a slightly modified version of a similiar game developed by Hovi (2008: 99). 
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In this chapter, I refer to the existence of a conflict of interest as the basic con-
dition for the quantity of aid provided to be less than the donor would ideally prefer. 
Conflicts of interest between donors and recipients have always been a part of aid giv-
ing.
20
 Traditionally, donors have approached this problem by giving aid on conditions.  
 
3.4. Conditionality 
Olav Stokke provides a useful definition of conditionality: 
 
The key element is the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening 
to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not 
met by the recipient. Foreign aid is used as a lever to promote objectives set 
by the donor which the recipient would not otherwise have agreed to 
(Stokke 1995: 12). 
 
 
As Stokke (1995: 12) points out, this definition places the emphasis on the coercive 
aspect of conditionality. However, conditionality consists of both sticks and carrots. 
After all, meeting the conditions will ―reward‖ the recipient with more aid than it 
would otherwise have received. Meeting the conditions can either be a prerequisite for 
entering into an aid relationship (ex ante conditions) or a stated goal that is to be fol-
lowed up afterwards (ex post conditions). In the litarature, the main focus has been on 
ex post conditionality. Unless stated otherwise, I use the term ―conditionality‖ synon-
mously with ―ex post conditionality‖.   
Conditionality is a widely debated issue in the international development dis-
course that has been with us since the birth of foreign aid. As Riddell (2007: 235) puts 
it: ―[s]ince ODA was first given, it has always come with some strings attached‖. 
Those strings are there to ensure that the aid money will be spent efficiently on allevi-
ating poverty—and nothing else (Kanbur 2006: 1572-73). 
Over the years, both the view on conditionality and the conditions themselves 
have gone through big changes. In the 1950s, a common condition was to have in-
                                              
20
 Obviously, donor and recipient interests do not always diverge. One could easily imagine, for instance, that in 
cases of emergency aid given in response to devastating catastrophes, conditions would be redundant as donor 
and recipient interests would be the same (to rebuild the affected area). Even some long-term development aid 
comes without conditions attached, which implies that the donor sees no conflict of interest. China, for instance, 
is notorious for giving unconditional aid to regimes that western donors will not go near (The Economist 2010). 
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ward-looking industrialization projects based on import substitution. In the 1960s and 
1970s, expansion of social welfare systems was added to the list. In the 1980s, condi-
tions often included large-scale privatization and a general liberalization of the econ-
omy (Kanbur 2006: 1574). Conditionality came somewhat discredited out of the 
1980s, and even the World Bank—a notorious champion of conditionality—agreed 
that it had largely been a failure. However, the idea lived on and the 1990s saw the rise 
of ―policy conditionality‖, where the focus was not so much on economic reform as on 
good governance (Riddell 2007: 238). 
 Whatever its form, the persistence of conditionality speaks volumes. Although 
finding the right conditions to attach has proven elusive, the concept is still alluring as 
a solution to the conflict of interest described in the previous section. Figure 3.2 illus-
trates how conditionality can do this by adding a third stage to the game. 
In this game, Donor can ―punish‖ Recipient for not carrying through the re-
forms by stopping the aid flow. Knowing that Donor prefers to stop rather than keep 
giving aid if the promised reforms fail to materialize, Recipient complies, realizing 
Donor‘s most preferred outcome (1,1). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The donor-recipient game with conditionality 
0 
0 
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Conditionality is an intuitive way of solving conflicts of interest. Yet conditionality 
has a poor track record. The emerging consensus among scholars and policy-makers is 
that conditionality has been ineffective (Temple 2010: 4469), and that it ―simply does 
not seem to work― (Kanbur 2006: 1574).  In the next sections, I consider how condi-
tionality failure can lead to outcomes where less aid is given than the donor would ide-
ally prefer. 
Table 3.1 ranks the outcomes in the game in Figure 3.2 for Donor. We see that 
two outcomes meet the criteria of being both unsatisfactory for the donor and repre-
senting lower than potential quantities of aid: 1) when no aid is given (the ―no aid‖ 
outcome) and 2) when the aid flow is cut off (the ―stop giving aid‖ outcome).  
 
Table 3.1: Ranking of outcomes for Donor in the game in Figure 3.2 
 
  
 
 
 
How can conditionality failure lead to one of these two outcomes? Under complete 
information, we cannot end up the ―stop giving aid‖ outcome since Donor knows 
whether Recipient will reform or not, and can act accordingly at the first stage. I con-
sider how this outcome can be realized if we allow for incomplete information, in sec-
tion 3.5.  
The ―no aid‖ outcome can be realized in one of two ways.  First, the recipient 
may not be willing to reform, i.e., it may prefer not to receive aid to reforming. Se-
cond, Donor‘s threat to stop giving aid if Recipient does not reform may not be credi-
ble. Under complete information, Donor knows that Recipient knows that the threat is 
not credible and prefers not to provide aid at the first stage. In the next two sub-
sections, I consider these two scenarios in turn. 
 
Rank Outcome Aid quantity 
1 Donor gives aid, Recipient reforms All aid is given 
2 Donor does not give aid No aid is given 
3 Donor gives aid, Recipient reforms, Donor 
stops giving aid 
Some aid is given 
4 Donor gives aid, Recipient reforms, Donor 
keeps giving aid 
All aid is given 
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3.4.1 When conditions are too demanding  
In 2003, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) gave a 
grant of 48 million dollars to the Brazilian government to be used for AIDS preven-
tion. The transfer was to take place as annual payments over a five-year period, ending 
in 2008. However, in 2005, the conditions for the transfer suddenly changed.  
In 2003, the US congress had passed the Global Aids Act, which explicitly stat-
ed that prostitution contributes to the spread of the HIV virus and had made the eradi-
cation of prostitution a policy goal (US Congress 2003). Initially, this did not apply to 
USAID due to first amendment concerns. However, the Attorney General eventually 
cleared away these concerns, and the so-called ―Anti-prostitution pledge‖ became part 
of USAID‘s guidelines (Washington Post 2005). 
 Due to the delay, it was not until 2005 that Brazil was asked to officially con-
demn prostitution in order to be eligible for funds provided by USAID. Since coopera-
tion with prostitutes is an essential part of the Brazilian model for combating AIDS, 
they refused and rejected the remaining 40 million dollars of the grant (Wall Street 
Journal 2005). Presumably, the United States would have preferred if Brazil had com-
plied with the demands. If so, the outcome was clearly unsatisfactory for the donor. 
The model 
In the case of Brazil vs. USAID, the threat to withdraw aid, although credible, did not 
induce compliance from the recipient. To get a formal sense of the situation, consider 
the game in Figure 3.3.  Let Br denote the benefit to Recipient of receiving all the 
promised aid, and    the cost of reform.    is the payoff for Donor if Recipient re-
forms, while    represents the cost of giving all the aid. We assume that          
  , meaning that Donor prefers (i) giving aid to not giving aid if Recipient reforms and 
(ii) stop giving aid to keep giving aid if Recipient does not reform (making the threat 
to cut of the aid flow credible). For simplicity it is also assumed that    is zero if Re-
cipient does not carry out the reforms.   
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Figure 3.3: Formalized model of conditionality 
 
Plainly, Recipient will only prefer to comply with the conditions when the benefit of 
receiving all the aid is bigger than the benefit of receiving only the aid provided in the 
first stage, i.e., when              . Conversely, Recipient will not prefer to com-
ply when: 
 
(1)                   
 
which can be restated as: 
 
 (1.1)          (   )   
21
 
 
                                              
21
 Proof:   –                      –                               –             (  
 )   
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Sub-condition (1.1) shows how conditions can be too demanding such that Recipient 
prefers to have the aid flow cut off rather than to comply with Donor‘s demands.  
One aspect is the cost of reform (  ). Other things being equal, the higher the 
cost of reform, the less likely that the recipient will prefer to comply with the condi-
tions. It is not always apparent what the cost of reform is. In the case of Brazil vs. 
USAID, the Brazilian government was willing to meet the USAID more than half way. 
They brokered a 50-page document stipulating how American money would not be 
used to promote prostitutes‘ rights issues (Wall Street Journal 2005). The deal breaker 
was the demand for an official condemnation of prostitution. The cost in this case, it 
seems, was mostly political. 
 The other aspect is the potential loss of benefit when Donor stops giving aid, 
i.e., (   )  . The potential loss of aid money must be substantial for the threat to 
restrict aid to induce compliance. What constitutes as substantial varies from recipient 
to recipient, and the aid volume at stake must be seen in relation to the recipient‘s need 
for aid. Stokke (1995: 44) argues that ―[t]he extent of aid dependency of the recipient 
government […] affects its room for manoeuvre. If dependency is high, even marginal 
reductions in aid may hurt‖.22 The potential loss of utility from aid withdrawal is de-
termined by the size of    and  .  Formally, the benefits of receiving the rest of the 
promised aid are not sufficiently big (relative to the cost of reform) if: 
 
(1.2)          
  
(   )
   
23
 
(1.3)             – 
  
  
   
24
 
 
Sub-condition (1.2) shows that, other things being equal, the lower Br the lower the 
potential loss for the recipient. In our example, the USAID grant was a relatively small 
amount of Brazil‘s budget to fight AIDS, and it could easily be compensated with own 
                                              
22
 A thing to bear in mind is that economic loss sometimes can be converted to political gain. Conditionality is a 
form of foreign intervention, encroaching on national sovereignty. If the circumstances are right, the recipient 
government can whip up national sentiments against foreign intervention and turn ―loss in terms of financial 
capital (aid) into a gain in terms of […] political capital at home‖ (Stokke 1995: 43). 
23
 Proof:      (   )       (   )             
  
(   )
 
24
 Proof:   –                     –             –  
  
  
 
Andreas H. Hvidsten  Aid Commitments and Strategic Behavior 
39 
  
revenues (Wall Street Journal 2005). Seemingly, USAID did not have a lot of leverage 
in the situation. If the stakes had been higher, we might have seen a different result. 
 Another factor directly influencing the potential aid loss is the size of  . It fol-
lows from (   )   in condition (1.1), that increasing p lowers the incentives for Re-
cipient to comply with Donor‘s demands. Sub-condition (1.3) demonstrates how, other 
things being equal, providing a high proportion of the aid in the first stage decreases 
the severity of the threat to cut off the aid flow at the third stage.
25
  
Solving for equilibria 
When conditions are too demanding relative to the benefits of receiving all the aid, the 
threat to stop giving aid will not induce compliance. Under complete information, the 
donor knows this and face a choice between not giving aid ( ) and paying     . The 
only sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game is the Pareto suboptimal ―no aid‖ 
outcome.
26
 
The case of ex ante conditionality 
The game in Figure 3.3 is an example of ex post conditionality, where aid is given on 
the condition of future reform. The case of ex ante conditionality, where reform is a 
precondition for aid, can be illustrated by assuming that      . In this situation, no 
aid is provided before Recipient makes its move, removing the first stage of the game. 
 In the new, two-stage game, Recipient receives no benefit from not reforming 
(       ), which has implications for condition (1). Now, the recipient will not re-
form if    –       , i.e., if        . The cost-benefit analysis is simplified, but the 
conclusion remains the same. If the cost of reform outweighs the benefits of receiving 
all the aid, the conditions are too demanding and Recipient will not comply. In this 
case, the ―no aid‖ outcome, although unsatisfactory for the donor, is not Pareto subop-
timal as there is no other outcome preferred by both parties. 
 
                                              
25
 The size of p is only relevant in cases of ex post conditionality. 
26
 This outcome is of course somewhat different from the outcome in the empirical example, where aid was giv-
en and then restricted. 
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3.4.2 When the threat to withdraw aid is not credible 
Effective use of conditions requires a credible commitment to conditionality on the 
part of the donor. However, in the real world, conditions are routinely violated without 
consequences for the recipient (Kanbur 2006: 13). In a much cited study, Jakob Svens-
son (2003: 383) found ‖no link between a country`s reform effort, or fulfillment of 
conditionality, and the disbursement rate [of aid]‖. This backed up earlier studies that 
had found ‖no statistical relationship between policy change and aid flows‖ (Svensson 
2000: 64).   
Why are donors not committed to conditionality? Kanbur (2006: 1574-76) iden-
tifies two main strands of explanations in the literature. The first moves away from the 
simple donor-recipient model and looks at how different agents within the donor coun-
try benefit from the aid flow itself, regardless of its efficiency. These agents (e.g aid 
agencies) may fight the withdrawal of aid from a recipient country. 
  The second strand of explanations takes us back to the donor-recipient model. If 
a donor genuinely wants to improve the welfare of the recipient, this could undermine 
the credibility of the donor‘s threat to stop giving aid. Even if enforcing the conditions 
is best for the recipient country in the long run, it will inflict a short-term pain on the 
recipient that will tempt the donor to overlook the violation. This situation is known as 
a Samaritan‘s Dilemma (Coate 1995: 46; Svensson 2000: 63). 
 The Samaritan‘s dilemma is a real threat to conditionality for donors that care 
about the welfare of the recipient. In effect, ―[t]he Samaritan donor is incapable of 
credibly threatening to withdraw future aid‖ (Gibson et. al 2005: 89). Clearly, only 
highly altruistic donors can face a true Samaritan‘s Dilemma. Since donor countries 
tend to be driven more by strategic interest (see chapter 1), this kind of situation might 
not be that common. However, there are other reasons than altruism for why a donor‘s 
threat to restrict aid might lack credibility. 
In a study of when donors withdraw aid, Carew Boulding and Susan Hyde 
(2004), find that vested interests in the recipient country make enforcement of condi-
tions less likely. Using quantitative analysis, they conclude that the existence of strate-
gic and business interests, in particular, reduces the possibility of aid withdrawal—
even in cases of clear violations of conditions (Boulding & Hyde 2004: 2).  
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The model 
Whether its due to a Samaritan‘s Dilemma or vested interests (or other factors not con-
sidered here), the credibility of the threat to stop giving aid if conditions are not met 
suffers from the fact that withdrawing aid often is painful for the donor, too. To in-
clude this in the model, let   denote the negative utility incurred by Donor from stop-
ping the aid flow. The revised model is depicted in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Revised formalized model of conditionality 
 
The credibility problem arises if Donor prefers to keep giving aid rather than to stop 
giving aid after Recipient has chosen not to reform. Formally, this is the case when 
    is bigger than      –  . Since      is always larger than     the decisive fac-
tor is the size of   relative to   . More precisely, the threat to stop giving aid is not 
credible when the following condition is satisfied:  
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(2)         (   )  .
27
 
 
Technically this means that pledging more aid (increasing   ) and providing less of it 
in the first stage (decreasing  ) increases the credibility of the threat as it implies a 
higher cost of not cutting off the aid flow relative to  . A problem with this reasoning 
is that    and   probably form part of the calculation of  .
28
 However, the left side of 
the inequality offers some interesting insight. 
Other things being equal, the higher the   the less credible the threat to stop 
giving aid. In this model,   is a catch-all notation that can represent any negative 
feedback associated with aid cuts. If Donor faces a true Samaritan‘s Dilemma then   
is the moral cost associated with the added suffering of the poor in the recipient coun-
try. Thus, the more Donor cares about the short-term prospects of the poor, the less 
likely it will be committed to conditionality. This conclusion is in line with Svensson‘s 
(2000: 63) argument that conditionality is only credible in the hands of ―a donor with 
less aversion to [short-term] poverty‖. 
Solving for equilibria 
In the game in Figure 3.4, Donor only wants to give aid on conditions. However, both 
Recipient and Donor know that Donor will not enforce conditions in the event of non-
compliance. Therefore, Recipient will choose not to reform. Knowing this, Donor pre-
fers not to give aid at the first stage, leading to the Pareto suboptimal ―no aid‖ out-
come. 
Such a situation seems rather hypothetical. After all, the circumstances that dis-
courage the donor from stopping the aid flow (poverty and vested interests) are the 
same that encourage aid giving in the first place. In fact, a high   is probably more 
likely to have a positive effect on aid levels by preventing the donor from cutting off 
                                              
27
. Proof:  (   )                                               (   )   
28
 Exactly how    and   enter into the calculation of   is hard to say. One possibility is that if the amount of 
promised aid is large (high   ) then the negative feedback from not providing it ( ) will also be bigger. For 
instance, it seems reasonable to me to argue that the moral cost of withdrawing aid is higher the more the with-
drawal hurts the recipient economically. Other things being equal, the more aid is withdrawn the more the recipi-
ent suffers (economically). If this is the case, increasing    does not increase the credibility of the threat, quite 
the opposite.  
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the aid flow when conditions are not met. The existence of   is more likely to lead to 
outcomes with low levels of aid under incomplete information (see section 3.5.3). 
 
3.5. The impact of incomplete information 
Up until now, all games have been of complete information, that is, both players‘ pref-
erences and strategy sets are assumed to be common knowledge (Hovi 2008: 31). In 
this section, I relax this assumption in order to study how incomplete information can 
lead to outcomes with less than potential quantities of aid.  
The conventional way of modeling games of incomplete information is to in-
clude Nature as a player. Nature makes the first move in the game, establishing the 
players‘ strategic types, but at least one of the players is unable to observe this move. 
In effect, this turns the game into a game of imperfect information (Hovi 2008: 31), 
which in turn affects what solution concepts we can apply. In games of imperfect in-
formation, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is no longer satisfactory as a solu-
tion concept. In the following analysis, I apply the concept of perfect Bayesian equilib-
ria (PBE), which incorporates the notion of beliefs (Hovi 2008: 97). 
 As before, the aim is to identify how outcomes where less aid is given than the 
donor would ideally prefer can be realized. In section 3.4, I identified two such out-
comes: (i) the ―no aid‖ outcome and (ii) the ―stop giving aid‖ outcome (see Table 3.1). 
As mentioned, the ―stop giving aid‖ outcome will never materialize under complete 
information, since Donor can anticipate whether Recipient will reform or not (and can 
act accordingly at the first stage). However, in games of incomplete information, Do-
nor may misjudge what Recipient will do at the second stage. Hence, in this section, I 
also consider conditions for the ―stop giving aid‖ outcome to represent an equilibrium 
in the game.  
In sections 3.3 and 3.4, I found three conditions (including the basic condition) 
for less than potential quantities of aid to be given.
29
 In order to study the impact of 
incomplete information on these conditions, I consider three games of one-sided in-
complete information. In section 3.5.1, I show how uncertainty about Recipient‘s pref-
                                              
29
 The basic condition is that there must exist a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient (see sec-
tion 3.3). Condition (1):    –           (see section 3.4.1). Condition (2):    (   )   (see section 3.4.2). 
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erences changes the basic condition. In section 3.5.2, I present a game where Donor is 
uncertain about Recipient‘s willingness to reform. Finally, in section 3.5.3, I consider 
a game where Recipient is uncertain about Donor‘s commitment to conditionality 
(whether or not Donor is willing to cut off the aid flow). 
 
3.5.1 Uncertainty about the conflict of interest 
In section 3.3, I introduced the basic condition underlying all the subsequent models, 
namely the existence a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient. Under 
incomplete information, a conflict of interest is no longer strictly necessary to get out-
comes with less than potential quantities of aid.  
Consider the game depicted in Figure 3.1, in which there is conflict of interest. 
The conflict arises from the fact that Recipient‘s payoff of not reforming (2) is higher 
than its payoff of reforming (1). Under complete information, Donor knows this. 
However, imagine a situation where Donor is uncertain whether Recipient‘s payoff of 
reforming is 1 or 3. If the actual payoff is 1, it is a game of conflict of interest, howev-
er, if the real payoff is 3, then there is no conflict of interest. Assume that Donor be-
lieves the actual payoff to be 3 (i.e. that there does not exist any conflict of interest) 
with probability  . The expected utility of giving aid is then:    (   )(  ). 
Since Donor knows that not giving aid will yield a payoff of 0 with certainty, it 
will not give aid only if the following condition is satisfied:       .30 This illustrates 
how the basic condition changes if we allow for private information: now, the Pareto 
suboptimal outcome (   ) can only be realized if Donor believes that there exists a 
conflict of interest (with a sufficiently high probability). The revised basic condition is 
an improvement. It now accounts for cases where aid has been given unconditionally, 
even though there was some degree of conflict of interest.  
Consider the case of recent US aid to Pakistan. Pakistan is regarded as a crucial 
ally of the United States in their ―war on terror‖. In the period 2000-2009, a total of 
$12,6 billion (including military assistance) was given in aid to Pakistan by the United 
States. Most of this aid was unconditional as the United States presumably took it for 
                                              
30
 Proof:    (   )(  )          –                                           
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granted that Pakistan would use the money to fight the Taliban (Newsweek 2009). In 
other words, the United States believed that no conflict of interest existed that mandat-
ed the use of conditionality.  
 That turned out to be a false assumption. The first matter to surface was that, 
instead of fighting the Taliban, the Pakistani government had used some of the money 
to pay them off. A case of particular notice was the 2004 deal with Waziri militant 
leader Nek Mohammed that in the end fell through—and where US money ended up 
funding insurgency (Newsweek 2009). It did not stop there, however. In 2009, former 
Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf admitted that US aid had been used to strengthen 
Pakistan‘s defense against India (BBC 2009). As a response to these revelations, when 
a new five-year aid deal worth $7,5 billion was passed by the US congress in 2009, it 
came with stipulations explicitly prohibiting funds from being used to support terrorist 
groups or to attack neighboring countries (Newsweek 2009).
31
 
Assuming uncertainty about the underlying conflict of interest is undoubtedly 
more realistic. However, it also complicates the analysis substantially. When I now 
turn to the issue of conditionality, I assume there does in fact exist a conflict of inter-
est, and that this fact is common knowledge. This assumption is made purely for con-
venience in order to avoid the unnecessary complication of adding a second layer of 
uncertainty to the models.   
 
3.5.2 Uncertainty about the recipient’s willingness to reform 
Zimbabwe is a prime target for foreign aid. The country has faced a massive decline 
over the last decades. When it gained independence in 1980, it was on a strong eco-
nomic foundation. Now, 30 years later, it is in utter disarray. Hyperinflation has left 
the national currency worthless; unemployment hovers around 90%; 1 in 5 is infected 
with the HIV virus; and life expectancy at birth is the lowest in the world (CIA.gov 
2010; WHO.int 2010). 
                                              
31
 To which Pakistan‘s ambassador to the US allegedly quipped: ―There is no bullet that has been invented that 
Pakistan can be given to shoot a terrorist that cannot be used in case there is a war with India‖ (MumbaiMir-
ror.com). 
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 Robert Mugabe has controlled Zimbabwe since independence, and is considered 
responsible for its collapse. His international support has dwindled, and donors are 
reluctant to provide aid through official channels without sweeping political and eco-
nomic reforms. In 2008, Mugabe struck a power-sharing deal with the opposition that 
created the Government of National Unity. The new prime minister, opposition leader 
Morgan Tsvangirai, set out to woo international donors in order to get the economy 
going again. It turned out to be a tough sell. 
 Touring the international donor community in 2009, Tsvangirai secured a fair 
amount of foreign aid for Zimbabwe. However, he failed to convince donors to pro-
vide direct financial support to the new government. The United States pledged $73 
million in development assistance, but President Barack Obama made sure to point out 
that the money would ―not be going through the government directly, because we con-
tinue to be concerned about consolidating democracy, human rights and rule of law‖ 
(New York Times 2009). 
 When Tsvangirai came to Norway, it was the same story. The prime minister of 
Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, expressed his support for Zimbabwe‘s new government and 
claimed that Norway was ―prepared to start bilateral [aid] cooperation with the Gov-
ernment [of Zimbabwe]‖. However, such cooperation could not be established before 
there was viable progress ―in a number of areas‖ (Regjeringen.no 2009). 
 To date, the only countries that support the Government of National Unity di-
rectly are China and South Africa. As a consequence, the Zimbabwean government 
must rely on its own resources to deal with its whopping fiscal deficits, which threat-
ens the already fragile power-sharing arrangement (Reuters 2010). 
 Presumably, no one wants the new government to fail, which would push Zim-
babwe into further distress. The international donor community is united in its support 
for the government. However, donors do not want to provide direct government-to-
government aid, knowing that a fair amount of the money could end up in Robert Mu-
gabe‘s pockets. Consider this an example of how lack of trust in the donor-recipient 
relationship can lead to aid not being given, even if the donor wants to give. 
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The model 
We can model the situation described above as a game of incomplete information, 
where Recipient‘s strategic type is not common knowledge. In the game in Figure 3.5, 
Donor is uncertain of Recipient‘s willingness to reform. We assume that Recipient is 
either ―unwilling‖, in which case condition (1) holds, or ―willing‖, in which case it 
does not.
32
 Donor believes Recipient to be ―willing‖ with probability   (  is assumed 
to be common knowledge). The negative utility incurred by Donor from cutting off the 
aid flow ( ) is removed from the model in order to simplify the analysis.
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Incomplete information 1: Uncertainty about Recipient’s willingness to reform 
 
In this game, Donor makes the first move under uncertainty. When deciding whether 
to give aid or not, Donor knows the two possible strategic types Recipient can be, and 
can foresee what Recipient will do at the second stage in both contingencies. If the 
Recipient is ―willing‖, it will reform and Donor will get a net payoff of    –   . 
However, if Recipient is ―unwilling‖ it will not reform. In this case, Donor will stop 
giving aid at the third stage, and get a payoff of     . The following function denotes 
Donor‘s expected utility of giving aid: 
                                              
32
 Condition (1):    –          (The benefit of reforming is less than the benefit of receiving just the proportion 
p of the aid). 
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
EUDonor
Give aid :  (   –   )    (   )(    ) 
 
Solving for equilibria 
When will outcomes with less than potential amounts of aid be in equilibrium in this 
game? Since not giving aid yields a certain payoff of 0, Donor will not give aid if 
 (       )    (   )(    )     . Solving for   gives: 
 
(3)         
    
(   –        )
  
33
   
 
If condition (3) holds, the Pareto suboptimal ―no aid‖ outcome is the only PBE in the 
game. This is a pooling PBE where Recipient‘s true strategic type is not revealed. 
Since Donor does not give aid, the game ends without giving Recipient a chance to act 
(and thereby reveal its true type).  
 If condition (3) does not hold, we arrive at a different PBE, in which Recipient 
gets to act at the second stage. What will it do? Since we do not know Recipient‘s type 
we can go no further than to state the obvious: it will reform if ―willing‖ and not re-
form if ―unwilling‖. Since Donor will stop giving aid at the third stage if Recipient 
does not reform, the ―stop giving aid‖ outcome is realized if: 
 
Condition (3.1): 
1. Donor believes that Recipient is ―willing‖ with a probability q that satisfies the 
following condition:    
    
(   –        )
   
2. Recipient is ―unwilling‖, i.e.,    –         
 
Although this outcome is not Pareto suboptimal, it is still unsatisfactory the donor. 
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 Proof:  (   –   )    (   )(    )            –      –                    (   –          )   
           
   
(   –        )
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3.5.3 Uncertainty about the donor’s resolve 
Since the recipient (presumably) prefers to receive all the aid without undertaking the 
reforms, it may be tempted not to meet the conditions if it believes that the donor will 
keep giving aid regardless of efforts to reform. However, a recipient may miscalculate 
a donor‘s commitment to conditionality. 
    In 1991, a group of foreign donors led by Germany laid pressure on the Ken-
yan government to undertake political reforms. The donors‘ main demand was that the 
multi-party system—abolished in 1978—be re-established. They threatened to restrict 
aid if Kenya did not comply. This was in august. When there was no positive response 
from the Kenyan government, all quick-disbursing aid was suspended in November 
(Waller 1995: 118). 
 The aid withdrawal had an immediate effect. Within days, the Kenyan presi-
dent, Daniel Arap Moi, announced that article 2a of the constitution, which declared 
Kenya a one-party state, would be abolished and that elections would take place the 
following year. In December 1992, elections—although not entirely free and fair—
were held and the ruling party, KANU, conceded some power to the opposition. In the 
summer of 1993, negotiations to restart aid disbursement began (Waller 1995: 119). 
 The quick response by Kenya after the aid flow was stopped indicates that the 
donors‘ resolve took President Moi by surprise. If the Kenyan government had consid-
ered the threat to be credible, the rational response would have been to carry out the 
reforms without losing aid money. We can also assume that the donors would have 
preferred if the reforms had been carried out right away—without having to make 
good on their threat to stop the aid flow. Presumably, the outcome was unsatisfactory 
for all parties. 
The model 
Two conditions must be met for this kind of situation to occur. First, the recipient must 
consider the donor‘s threat to stop giving aid non-credible. Second, the donor must in 
fact be willing to stop the aid flow. We can formalize the argument by modeling a 
game of incomplete information as depicted in Figure 3.6, where Recipient is uncer-
tain of Donor‘s cost of cutting off the aid flow.  
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The game in Figure 3.6 deviates from the original game as seen in Figure 3.4. 
The first stage has been removed, giving Recipient the first move.
34
 The payoffs have 
also been changed somewhat, in order to better illustrate the empirical example. Since 
the first stage has been removed,   becomes 0 and Donor‘s cost of stop giving aid is 
now just   . Furthermore, the status quo is no longer no aid given, but aid given 
without reform (as presumably has been case up until the start of the game). We as-
sume that since Donor has invested in conditionality it would incur a negative utility if 
aid continued to flow without reform. This negative utility is assumed to be inversely 
proportional to the positive utility associated with making Recipient reform (  ).   
The starting point for the game in Figure 3.6 is that Donor has demanded that 
Recipient carry out certain reforms, and has threatened to stop giving aid if it does not. 
Recipient moves first, and can choose between reforming and not reforming. Reform-
ing means having to pay the cost of reform (  ), and will thus yield a payoff of    . 
Notice that, unlike previous games, there is no extra benefit to be obtained by reform-
ing. In effect, Recipient has to pay to maintain the status quo. If Recipient chooses not 
to reform, the game moves to the second stage, and its payoff will depend on Donor‘s 
resolve in the face of non-compliance.  
 
                                              
34
 See appendix for a brief consideration of how the original three-stage game would be influenced by uncertain-
ty about Donor‘s commitment to conditionality. 
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Figure 3.6: Incomplete information 2: Uncertainty about Donor’s resolve 
 
In this game, Recipient is uncertain about Donor‘s cost of stopping the aid flow ( ). 
However, it knows that Donor can either be ―tough‖, meaning that       , or 
―weak‖, in which case       . If Donor is ―tough‖ it will stop giving aid if Recipient 
fails to reform, and Recipient will lose the benefit of receiving aid (   ). However, if 
Donor is ―weak‖ it will not stop the aid flow, and status quo will be maintained for 
Recipient ( ). Let q denote the probability with which Recipient considers Donor to be 
―weak‖. This gives the following function for Recipient‘s expected utility of not re-
forming: 
 ( )    (   )(   )             
 
Solving for equilibria 
When will ―stop giving aid‖ be a PBE in this game? We assume that the threat to stop 
giving aid is sufficiently severe, i.e.        , meaning that Recipient would rather 
reform than to not receive aid. Thus, the only way to end up at the ―stop giving aid‖ 
outcome is if Recipient erroneously believes Donor to be ―weak‖. Formally, this is the 
case when:  
 


EURecipient
Not reform:
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Condition (4): 
1. Recipient believes Donor to be ―weak‖ with a probability q that satisfies the 
following condition:     
(   –   )
  
   
35
 
2. Donor is in fact ―tough‖, i.e.        
 
In this game, the ―stop giving aid‖ outcome is Pareto suboptimal.  
Did Kenya misjudge its donors‘ cost of stopping the aid flow? That might very 
well be the case. The Kenyans certainly had reasons to believe that the donors‘ costs of 
stopping the aid flow were considerable. Britain and the United States were especially 
reluctant as they both had close ties to President Moi—and Kenya in general. Most of 
the capital invested in Kenya was British, and British nationals constituted the biggest 
group of foreigners living in Kenya (Waller 1995: 188). For the Americans, President 
Moi was a crucial ally in pursuing military-strategic interests in the region, and then 
US President, George H. Bush, was openly ―reluctant to support [aid cuts]‖ (Schmitz 
1999: 58). Yet both countries backed the German lead initiative in the end. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I considered how strategic interaction between a donor and a recipient 
might lead the donor to give less aid than it would ideally prefer. Specifically, I con-
sidered the possibility that the donor only wants to give aid on the condition of certain 
behavior of the recipient. If the recipient does not conform to this behavior, less than 
potential quantities of aid will be provided, which is an unsatisfactory outcome for the 
donor. I identified two such outcomes: (i) the ―no aid‖ outcome, where the donor does 
not provide aid at all, and (ii) the ―stop giving aid‖ outcome, where the donor with-
draws aid (see Table 3.1). 
Under complete information, an actual conflict of interest between the donor 
and the recipient is necessary to arrive at outcomes with less than potential quantities 
of aid. However, as demonstrated in section 3.5.1, this condition is relaxed if we allow 
for the possibility that the donor can be uncertain about the recipient‘s preferences. In 
this case, it is enough that the donor believes that there is a conflict of interest.  
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 Proof:                                      
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In theory, the conflict of interest can be resolved with conditionality. By impos-
ing conditions on the recipient—and threatening to withdraw the aid if they are not 
met—the donor can shape the recipient‘s incentives towards compliance. However, we 
can still get outcomes with less than potential quantities of aid if conditionality fails. I 
considered two such possibilities.  
First, the recipient may prefer to have aid restricted rather than to comply with 
the conditions. Under complete information, the recipient may consider the conditions 
too demanding and prefer not to receive aid. Under incomplete information, the recipi-
ent may claim to be willing to comply with the conditions. The donor may not believe 
the claims, leading to the ―no aid‖ outcome. Alternatively, the donor may erroneously 
believe that the recipient is willing to reform, and stop giving aid when the reforms do 
not materialize, leading to the ―stop giving aid‖ outcome.  I considered these scenarios 
in sections 3.4.1 (complete information) and 3.5.2 (incomplete information). Table 3.2 
summarizes the main findings in these sections. 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of the findings in sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.2 
 
Second, the threat to withdraw the aid may not be credible. This is the case when the 
donor prefers to keep giving aid rather than stop giving aid in the event of non-
compliance by the recipient. I considered two ways that lack of credibility can lead to 
less than potential quantities of aid. First, under complete information, it is common 
knowledge that the donor is not committed to conditionality. In this case, the donor 
prefers not to give aid at all. Second, under incomplete information, the recipient may 
be uncertain about the donor‘s resolve and erroneously believe that it will not restrict 
 Situation Outcome Pareto efficiency 
Complete information Donor knows that Recipi-
ent prefers to not reform 
No aid is given Pareto suboptimal 
Incomplete information Donor believes that Re-
cipient is unwilling to 
reform 
No aid is given Pareto suboptimal 
Donor erroneously be-
lieves that Recipient is 
willing to reform 
Aid flow is cut off Pareto optimal, but un-
satisfactory for Donor 
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aid, leading to the ―stop giving aid‖ outcome. I considered these scenarios in sections 
3.4.2 and 3.5.3. Table 3.3 summarizes the main findings.  
 
Table 3.3: Summary of findings in sections 3.4.2 and 3.5.3 
 
The situations considered in this chapter are not unknown in the real world. Table 3.4 
summarizes all the outcomes with lower than potential quantities of aid described in 
this chapter and links them to the empirical examples. 
It is beyond this thesis to calculate how much of donor stinginess such situa-
tions can account for. However, we can conclude with some certainty that the ―loss‖ of 
aid money due to problems in the donor-recipient relationship is substantial. For in-
stance, in the Kenya case (see section 3.5.3) $350 million was at stake (Waller 1995: 
118). We can only speculate as to how much the international donor community would 
have given to a Zimbabwe without Robert Mugabe, but it seems fair to say—
considering the importance of this huge country and its desperate need for aid—that 
hundreds of millions of dollars would not be out of the ballpark.  
  
 Situation Outcome Pareto efficiency 
Complete information Donors lack of commit-
ment to conditionality is 
common knowledge 
No aid is given Pareto suboptimal 
Incomplete information Recipient erroneously 
believes that Donor will 
not withdraw aid 
Aid flow is cut off Pareto suboptimal (in a 
two-stage game) 
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Table 3.4: Situations where less aid is given than the donor would ideally prefer  
 
  
Basic condition Information Situation Outcome Case 
Donor knows, or 
believes with 
sufficiently high 
probability that 
there exists a 
conflict of inter-
est 
Conditionality 
 
Incomplete 
information 
Donor believes that 
Recipient is unwill-
ing to reform 
No aid is given Zimbabwe 
2009 
Donor erroneously 
believes that Recipi-
ent is willing to re-
form. Donor prefers 
to cut off the aid 
flow in the event of 
non-compliance* 
Aid flow is cut 
off  
- 
Recipient errone-
ously believes that 
Donor is not willing 
to cut off the aid 
flow in the event of 
non-compliance*† 
Aid flow is cut 
off 
Kenya 1991 
Donor knows that 
Recipient believes 
that Donor is not 
willing to cut off the 
aid flow in the event 
of non-compliance 
(see appendix) 
No aid is given - 
Complete 
information 
Donor knows that 
Recipient is unwill-
ing to reform 
No aid is given Brazil 2005 
Common knowledge 
that Donor is not 
committed to condi-
tionality  
No aid is given - 
Conditionality not an option No aid is given - 
Donor errone-
ously believes 
that there is no 
conflict of inter-
est 
 Aid is cut off 
or conditional-
ity applied 
Pakistan 
2001-09 
* Requires actual conflict of interest 
† Assumes that Recipient has the first move. Alternatively, that it is a game of two-sided incomplete 
information where a “tough” Donor erroneously believes that Recipient believes that Donor is “tough”. 
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3.7. Appendix 
3.7.1 Uncertainty about Donor’s resolve: Equilibria in the three stage model 
The equilibrium specified in condition (4) is a separating equilibrium, in which Donor 
reveals his true strategic type during the course of the game.
36
 At the end of the game 
there is no longer any uncertainty about whether Donor is ―tough‖ or ―weak‖ since 
Donor is forced to act if Recipient does not reform, just as Kenya‘s donors were in 
1991. Consider what would happen if we kept the original three-stage model (Figure 
3.4), while assuming that Donor‘s cost of cutting off the aid flow is not common 
knowledge. In this game ―weak‖ would imply that condition (2) is satisfied, while 
―tough‖ would mean that it is not. 
This time Donor gets to make the first move. Since the probability with which 
Recipient believes Donor to be ―weak‖ (i.e. that condition (2) holds) is common 
knowledge, Donor is able to calculate Recipient‘s expected utility of not reforming 
and can therefore foresee Recipient‘s move at the second stage. Hence, if   is suffi-
ciently big, so that Recipient will not reform, Donor will not give aid regardless of 
whether it is in fact ―tough‖ or ―weak‖. This outcome would represent a pooling PBE, 
as the Donor‘s true strategic type would not be revealed.37  
It is certainly possible to imagine a situation where aid is not given because Do-
nor knows that Recipient believes it to be ―weak‖, but such intimate knowledge of be-
liefs seems a bit far-fetched. A more realistic situation might be that Donor believes 
that Recipient believes that Donor is ―weak‖. One could model this kind of situation as 
a game of two-sided incomplete information, where Donor is uncertain about Recipi-
ents beliefs. In this game both situations where less than the potential amount of aid is 
given can be an equilibrium outcome. Still, it would be hard to find examples of this 
kind of situations, and such a model would be rather hypothetical in nature.  
 
                                              
36
 This can be proven using Baye‘s rule to update Recipient‘s believes, where A = Donor is ―tough‖ and B = 
Donor stops giving aid:  (   )                (   )     . 
37
  (   )                (   )    
 
 
. A fraction with 0 as the denominator is undefined, so we can‘t 
really use Baye‘s rule in this instance. However, we can assume that at the end of the game Recipient still be-
lieves Donor to be ―tough‖ with a probability of  .  
 Chapter 4 Donor-donor games I: Pareto ef-
ficiency 
 
4.1. Purpose and plan 
In this and the next chapters, I focus on the strategic interaction between donor states 
and how this interaction is shaped by the circumstances in which they operate. More 
specifically, I look at whether and how these circumstances might lead to Pareto 
suboptimal levels of aid, i.e., outcomes where all donors would gain from a multilat-
eral increase in aid efforts. By circumstances I mean: a) the characteristics of aid giv-
ing and the composition of the donor group, and b) the legal and political framework 
(i.e. regime) in which the donor group operates.  
These two aspects build on each other. The characteristics of aid giving and the 
structure of the donor group influence the ex ante outcome, which, in turn, affects the 
conditions for the regime to be effective. Consequently, the analysis consists of two 
parts. In this chapter, I find the conditions for the ex ante provision of aid to be Pareto 
suboptimal, postponing the discussion of regime structure to chapter 5. 
The analysis in this chapter rests on two assumptions. First, I assume that for-
eign aid is a contribution to a public good. Second, I assume that all donors view for-
eign aid as a contribution to a public good. I briefly discuss validity of these assump-
tions, in section 4.2.  
A classic finding in the literature on public goods is that they are often under-
provided and that the problem of provision is shaped by properties of the provision 
group as well as properties of the good. In sections 4.3 and 4.4, I look at how these 
aspects shape the voluntary provision of foreign aid. More precisely, I find the condi-
tions for the provision to be Pareto suboptimal. 
 
4.2. Foreign aid and public goods 
Is foreign aid a contribution to a public good? And do donors look at aid this way? The 
analysis in both this and the next chapters rests on the assumption that the answer to 
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both questions is ―yes‖. In this section, I briefly consider the validity of this assump-
tion. 
 
4.2.1 Is foreign aid a contribution to a public good? 
In an interdependent world, global development is more than a moral imperative; one 
could make the case for foreign aid solely on grounds of self-interest. This is particu-
larly visible in the border areas between rich and poor parts of the world, for instance 
between Europe and Africa. Most of the world‘s fragile states are located in Africa and 
according to Giorgia Giovanneti (2009) they are ―bad neighbors, as negative spillover 
effects such as instability, lower growth, diseases, refugees, trafficking, and smuggling 
spread rapidly‖. 
 As a consequence, European donors are integrating their approach to creating 
development in Africa. When the EU Commission presented the EU Strategy for Afri-
ca in 2005 it emphasized that ―Africa‘s development is also very much in Europe‘s 
interest, economically, politically and strategically. Attaining the MDGs [for Africa] is 
therefore a shared objective and a common goal‖ (EU 2005: 9). It called for a ―com-
mon, coherent and comprehensive‖ strategy towards Africa (Ibid.). 
 The incentives to improve their own neighborhoods are likely to be strong, so it 
is reasonable to assume that development is at least a regional public good. But is 
there also a bigger perspective? The Monterrey Consensus (2002) certainly provides 
some lofty rhetoric on how financing for development is a global challenge, but is this 
really the case? For something to be a truly global concern, every country in the world 
must potentially be affected. Is development a global public good, in the same way as, 
for instance, mitigating climate change or conserving the ozone layer are global public 
goods?  
According to DAC, it is. In The DAC Guidelines for Poverty Reduction (2001) 
the argument is made that globalization spreads the social ills associated with poverty 
not just across borders, but also across continents. 
 
Eradicating poverty is thus more than a moral and humanitarian imperative. 
It is also essential for global security and prosperity and for reducing envi-
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ronmental stresses. It is an international public good of the first order, serv-
ing the interests of all (DAC 2001: 15, emphasis added). 
 
Among scholars there has been some debate as to whether foreign aid is primarily a 
contribution to public or private goods. Hayashi (2002: 2) consider that only multilat-
eral foreign aid qualify as contributions to a public good, since ―[b]ilateral foreign aid 
[is used] as a policy instrument to achieve objectives that are not shared with other 
nations‖. It is difficult to disagree with the sentiment that multilateral aid is a more 
pure form of contribution to a public good than bilateral aid. However, assuming that it 
fosters development I would argue that all aid provides public benefits in some way: 
 
The foreign aid that the industrialized democracies give to the underdevel-
oped countries is a collective good to these aid-giving nations, at least to the 
extent that they all value the development of the less developed areas (Olson 
& Zeckhauser 1966: 275). 
 
4.2.2 Do donors view aid as contributing to a public good? 
Even if foreign aid can be seen a contribution to a public good it is by no means cer-
tain that donors look at foreign aid this way. In fact, at least some policymakers proba-
bly have a different perspective. For instance, Morten Høglund, spokesperson on for-
eign policy for the Norwegian Progress Party, finds the idea that foreign aid is a con-
tribution to a public good abstract at best (Interview 16.09.10).  
However, there are signs that donor states increasingly view alleviating poverty 
and fostering development as global goals. According to Torbjørn Gaustadsæther,
38
 
there is today a more explicit recognition in the donor community that ―it is in every-
body‘s interest […] that poor countries do not remain poor […], stability and devel-
opment in the South is important to the global economy, and it prevents spill-over ef-
fects such as migration [to the rich countries]‖ (Interview 12.05.10). 
 In fact, Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999) argue that the international donor com-
munity has embraced the notion of foreign aid as a contribution to public goods. To-
wards the end of the 1990s, the public good-perspective promised a welcomed new 
―rationale for foreign aid, closer to the security than to the solidarity agenda‖, resting 
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 Torbjørn Gaustadsæther is a Special Advisor at the Section for Development Policy at the Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 
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more on ―the direct spillovers of the lack of development in poor countries on to the 
well being of rich countries‖ (Jayaraman & Kanbur 1999: 419). 
To sum up, the assumptions that foreign aid is a contribution to a public good 
and that donors view it as such are not unproblematic. However, they do represent an 
interesting and perhaps emerging perspective on foreign aid. In the remaining part of 
this chapter, I assume that foreign aid is a contribution to the public good ―eradication 
of poverty‖, and consider how the characteristics of this good and the structure of the 
providing group can lead to Pareto suboptimal levels of aid.   
 
4.3. The characteristics the good 
International public goods come in different varieties. The problem of providing such 
goods depends on both the characteristics of the good itself and on the structure of the 
provision group (Hovi 1986: 337). With regards to properties of the good, two aspects 
in particular shape the provision problem (Hovi 1986: 338-340).  
First, it matters whether the good is inclusive or exclusive. A good is inclusive 
if the consumption by one country does not subtract from the consumption by other 
countries. Although some benefits of eradicating poverty are exclusive—for instance 
market shares in emerging markets—I would argue that, in general, the benefits from 
poverty reduction are non-rival. Hence, the eradication of poverty is an inclusive good.  
Second, it matters whether the good is ―lumpy‖, i.e., can be provided only in 
some minimum amount, or is available in continuous quantities. Eradicating poverty 
can clearly be done to different degrees. Although the effects of further contributions 
level out as poverty disappears, there is no clear threshold where further efforts have 
no effect. Eradication of poverty thus qualifies as a continuous good.  
Assuming that eradication of poverty is an inclusive and continuous good, what 
do these characteristics entail for its provision? The conventional view is that ―instanc-
es of inclusive goods tend to be more ‗benign‘ than those involving exclusive goods‖, 
but that continuous goods ―typically will be more seriously undersupplied than lumpy 
goods‖ (Hovi 1986: 351-2). 
Cases of inclusive goods are benign in the sense that every country receives all 
of the good, and thus face incentives resembling the case where the good in question is 
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of a private nature. Even if no one else contributes, each group member will benefit 
from providing some of the good; at least in small groups (Hovi 1986: 344).
39
 
The fact that eradicating poverty is an inclusive good bodes well for its provi-
sion (compared with exclusive goods). However, its continuous nature has the effect 
that the incentives to contribute decline as the number of contributors increases. Alt-
hough more contributions always increase the amount of the good, the temptation to 
free ride on the efforts of the other group members increases as more of the good is 
provided (Ibid.). 
Adding to the challenge is that eradicating poverty is not something one or a 
few rich countries can do by themselves. Rather, as a public good it displays the char-
acteristics of what Barrett (2007: 7) calls an aggregate effort good, whose provision 
depends on the combined efforts of all countries. According to Barrett (2007: 101), 
―public goods requiring aggregate efforts are particularly susceptible to free riding‖. 
With such goods, every country‘s contribution is perfectly substitutable for every other 
country‘s contribution. This has the effect that if one group of countries supplies more 
of the good, this adversely affects the rest of the countries‘ incentives to do the same. 
Indeed, ―they may have an incentive to pare back‖ (Ibid.). 
To sum up: based on the characteristics of the good we can expect ―eradication 
of poverty‖ to be provided in a certain amount but at the same time undersupplied in 
the sense that not all the members of the provision group are likely to contribute. This 
prediction does not tell us much about what to expect with regards to Pareto efficien-
cy. When will the equilibrium outcome be Pareto optimal, and, more important, when 
will all donors prefer full contribution? In the next section, I look at how the structure 
of the group under consideration affects the Pareto efficiency of the outcome. 
  
4.4. The characteristics of the group 
The provision group in this case is a set of donor states. In the literature on aid and 
public goods, little attention has been paid to the properties of the group. This is not 
surprising considering that the focus has been primarily on one group: the OECD do-
                                              
39
 In a large group, incentives to contribute are hampered by the fact that one member‘s efforts produce very 
little of the public good, while bearing all the cost of provision.  
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nor community, represented by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (e.g. 
Olson & Zeckhauser 1966; Dudley 1979; Mosley 1985; Hayashi 2002). However, I 
would argue that the international donor community consists of several donor groups; 
all with different properties (see section 4.5.1). In this section, I explore how some of 
these properties affect the Pareto efficiency of the voluntary provision of aid.  
At least two aspects of the providing group shape the provision problem accord-
ing to Hovi (1986: 338-340). More specifically, he distinguishes between small and 
big groups, and between symmetrical and asymmetrical groups. Symmetry or asym-
metry in this case refers to equality or inequality in size among the actors providing 
the good. 
Although both these aspects are relevant they do not capture one essential char-
acteristic of eradicating poverty, namely the asymmetry of interest: some donors dis-
play an apparent interest in eradicating poverty, while others see foreign aid primarily 
as a foreign policy tool for achieving other objectives. To capture this element I add 
one property, the difference in interest, to the analytical scheme.  
Unlike the properties of the good, which I assume to be constant, group charac-
teristics vary across donor groups. In the following sub-sections, I examine how the 
group properties of asymmetry in interest, asymmetry in size, and group size affect the 
Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium outcome. Throughout the analysis I use the DAC 
donor group to illustrate the results. Before we begin the analysis, let us briefly review 
some theoretical expectations. 
 
4.4.1 Theoretical expectations       
With respect to group size, a classic finding in the literature on public goods is that 
voluntary contribution to public goods is more likely in small groups. However, in 
cases of inclusive goods, group size is often considered to be of less significance to the 
provision (Hovi 1986: 351). With regards to the Pareto efficiency of the outcome, the 
literature offers little guidance.  
Regarding asymmetry, the conventional view is that asymmetrical groups, con-
taining actors of different size, generally increase the likelihood that an inclusive, con-
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tinuous good is provided in Pareto optimal quantities. Furthermore, in such situations, 
small actors tend to exploit big actors (Olsen & Zeckhauser 1966).  
The reasoning behind this prediction is that any big actor will provide the 
amount of the good that it considers optimal. Since the good is inclusive and continu-
ous, the small actors can then consume the good provided by the big actor, without 
having to contribute. Although this outcome is characterized ―by an unequal distribu-
tion of gains among the players‖, it is Pareto optimal (Hovi 1986: 356).  
As Hovi (1986: 356-357) points out, the fact that this outcome is Pareto effi-
cient does not follow with necessity from the assumption of asymmetry. In my view, 
the situation described above is actually a special case that rests on the assumption that 
big actors want more of the good than small actors do. Often, this assumption is far 
from self-evident. In the case of ―eradicating poverty‖, it seems outright wrong.  
 
4.4.2 Asymmetry I: Interest 
As argued, donors differ in their interest in eradicating poverty. We can thus expect 
donor countries to face different incentives to contribute to this end. Since we are deal-
ing with a continuous, inclusive public good, I assume that all donors incur a marginal 
increase in utility from their own and others‘ contribution to eradicating poverty. 
However, I also assume that not all donors‘ utility functions are identical. 
Consider two types of donors, labeled altruistic and strategic. These labels are 
not assumptions about motivation. Whether a donor is altruistic or strategic does not 
depend not on their rationale for giving aid, but on their incentives to contribute to 
eradicating poverty. The defining property of an altruistic donor is that its utility from 
adding to the public good always outweighs the potential utility of defecting. For the 
strategic donor, however, the utility of contributing to the good is outweighed by the 
utility of defecting once the good has been provided in a certain threshold amount.  
The Schelling-diagram in Figure 4.1 depicts the utility ( ) from playing con-
tribute (denoted by  ) and not contribute (denoted by  ) for both altruistic (   and   ) 
and strategic donors (   and   ) as functions of the number of other contributors ( ). 
For now, I assume that all donors are equal in every other way than interest. 
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Figure 4.1: The utility curves of giving aid and not giving aid for altruistic and strategic do-
nors 
 
In this game, the altruistic donors face a game of Utopia while the strategic donors see 
it as a game of Chicken. The Nash equilibrium of the game depends on the mix of do-
nor types. If the number of altruistic donors is bigger than or equal to   , the equilibri-
um outcome is that all altruistic donors contribute and all strategic donors defect. If the 
number of altruistic donors is less than   , the equilibrium becomes that all altruistic 
donors and some strategic donors contribute, and the rest defect. In all instances, there 
is a tendency for exploitation of the altruistic donors. The provision in this case may be 
Pareto suboptimal, as all donors may prefer full contribution to the outcome where 
only    donors contribute. 
 The model in Figure 4.2 does not take into account one special property of erad-
icating poverty, namely that all donors will probably make some sort of contribution. 
After all, not even the most aid critical government is likely to stop giving foreign aid 
entirely. Hence, a choice only between giving and not giving aid does not really cap-
ture the essence of this particular provision problem.  
A better model would allow donors to make continuous choices regarding the 
size of their aid budgets. However, to keep the simplicity of a binary model, consider a 
situation where the strategic donors are already spending their threshold amount on 
foreign aid. In this game, all donors face a choice of either increasing their aid budget 
(denoted by  ) or not increasing their aid budget (denoted by  ). The new model is 
depicted in Figure 4.2. 
𝐶𝐴 
𝐷𝐴 𝑆 
𝐶𝑆 
𝑧𝑗 𝑧 
𝑈 
  n -1 
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In the revised model, the strategic donors have Prisoners‘ Dilemma (PD) pref-
erences. They still incur a marginal increase in utility from contributing, but they now 
face clear incentives to free ride. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The utility curves of increasing the aid budget and not increasing the aid budget 
for altruistic and strategic donors. 
 
In this game, the only Nash equilibrium is that all altruistic donors contribute while all 
strategic donors defect, regardless of the number of altruistic donors. When is this 
equilibrium Pareto sub-optimal? We see from the model that there is a tipping point: as 
long as    —i.e. the number of altruistic donors is less than  —the equilibrium out-
come is Pareto sub-optimal. To see why, consider that less than   contributors give the 
strategic donors a utility of less than  , i.e., less than they would have gotten if all 
donors contributed. This shows that the ratio of altruistic to strategic donors within the 
group is crucial to whether the outcome is Pareto suboptimal or not.  
Since donors in the real world come in different sizes, it is not really the number 
of altruistic donors that is the decisive factor. After all, one altruistic donor could be 
enough to make the outcome Pareto optimal if that donor is sufficiently big. To ac-
count for difference in size, we can apply the notion of player weights. In this case, 
each donor is assigned a weight according to its capacity for contributing, i.e. econom-
ic size.  
𝐶𝐴 
𝐷𝐴 𝑆 
𝐶𝑆 
𝑘 𝑧 
𝑈 
  
n -1 
𝑈𝑘 
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Let   represent not the number of contributors, but the combined player weight 
of these contributors. Likewise, n is now not the total number of donors, but the com-
bined player weights of all donors in the group. Furthermore, let    and    denote the 
combined player weights of altruistic donors and strategic donors, respectively. The 
following condition must hold for the equilibrium outcome to be Pareto suboptimal: 
 
(5)       
  
  
  
 
   
 
 
Condition (5) tells us that, other things being equal, the smaller the proportion of altru-
istic donors, and the smaller the size of the altruistic donors, the higher the probability 
that the quantity of aid provided will be Pareto suboptimal.  
The case of DAC 
Is condition (5) met in the DAC group of donors? To answer this question, we need to 
divide the group into two sub-groups: altruistic and strategic donors. For this end, I 
simply use whether the donor in question has met the 0.7 aid target or not as a demar-
cation criterion. This gives us five altruistic and 17 strategic DAC donors, i.e., an al-
truistic-strategic ratio of 5 to 17.  
To account for size, we can weigh each donor in terms of the smallest donor, 
which is Luxembourg. For instance, the United States equals 336 Luxembourgs. The 
combined player weight of the altruistic DAC donors is 51, while the corresponding 
player weight of strategic donors is 871, giving a ratio of  
  
   
. Such a small number 
could mean that condition (5) is satisfied, i.e., that the aid provision is Pareto subopti-
mal and that all donors would prefer a multilateral increase in aid levels. 
 
4.4.3 Asymmetry II: size 
In this section, I consider the effects of asymmetry in size on the Pareto efficiency of 
the equilibrium outcome. I assume that economic size is directly proportional to a do-
nor‘s potential contribution to the good. In order to isolate the effects of asymmetry, I 
first consider a (very) special case with only two donors, both of which are strategic. 
Later, I return to an N-player model and allow for altruistic donors. 
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The two-player model 
Figure 4.3 depicts a game with two donors of different size: a small donor (SD) and a 
big donor (BD). Let    and    denote the cost of contribution for SD and BD, respec-
tively. I assume that the benefit of more aid ( ) is equally enjoyed by both actors, re-
gardless of who contributes. Let    denote the proportion of the total increase that cor-
responds to SD and    the proportion that corresponds to BD (           ). Both 
players can either choose to contribute (increase their aid budget) or to defect (not in-
crease their aid budget). 
 
B = Benefit if both players con-
tribute. 
cS/B = The cost of contribution. 
pa/s = The proportion of the total 
contribution corresponding to 
each donor. 
BD 
Contribute Defect 
SD 
Contribute 
           
              
Defect 
           
        
 
Figure 4.3: An aid game with two donors of different size 
 
Since both donors are strategic, they incur a negative utility by being the sole contribu-
tor, meaning that 
 
(5.1)        –       , where        .  
 
The strategic nature of the donors has two consequences in this game. First, it ensures 
that mutual defection is a Nash equilibrium: since being the sole contributor entails a 
negative utility, defection must be the best response to defection.  
Second, it eliminates the outcome where both donors contribute as a potential 
Nash equilibrium. To see why, consider that in order for mutual contribution not to be 
an equilibrium outcome, a temptation to free ride must be present. In this game, the 
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payoff of free riding is    , where    . Hence, the following condition must hold for 
mutual defection to be the only Nash equilibrium:  
   
(5.2)                  
 
Closer scrutiny reveals that condition (5.2) is simply a restatement of (5.1), since 
         . Accordingly, we can rewrite (5.1)     –        as (      )  
                .
 40
 Hence, (5.2) is true by assumption. 
Although mutual defection is the unique equilibrium, it is not necessarily Pareto 
suboptimal. For this to be the case, the following condition must hold: 
  
(5.3)                                                        
 
Since B is assumed to be equal for both SD and BD while    varies with economic 
size, it is less likely that (5.3) holds for BD than for SD. After all, BD‘s cost-benefit 
ratio is less favorable than that of SD. In effect, the size of the biggest donor decides 
what the minimum benefit of full contribution ( ) must be in order for all parties to 
gain from it.  
Consider   as a function of the number and size of contributions. Specifically, 
let   be defined as 
 
      ∑   
 
   , where      .
41
  
 
In the two-player case under consideration: 
 
   (     ) 
 
                                              
40
 Proof: (     )                                               
41
   cannot be equal to or greater than 1 because this would violate assumption (5.2). To see why, consider that if 
   , then        . Substituting B for       in (5.2) gives the following inequality (from SD‘s perspec-
tive)            , which can be rewritten as the plainly incorrect      . 
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This allows us to rewrite condition (5.3) (from the perspective of BD) as  (     )  
  , which can be restated as 
 
(5.5)         
  
     
 
 
It follows from (5.5) that the bigger the asymmetry between SD and BD, the bigger   
must be in order for mutual defection to be Pareto suboptimal. Thus, other things being 
equal, strong asymmetry within a group of strategic donors decreases the chance that 
full contribution represents a Pareto improvement. 
The N-player model 
To restate the condition it in general terms, we can include the presence of altruistic 
donors. Consider an N-player game with both strategic and altruistic donors. The 
unique Nash equilibrium in such a game is that all altruistic donors contribute while all 
strategic donors defect.  
Let    and    denote the potential contribution of all the strategic and all the al-
truistic donors, respectively. In the equilibrium outcome, the payoff for the strategic 
donors is    . For full contribution to be a Pareto improvement on this outcome, the 
following condition must hold:  (       )        . That is: 
 
(5.6)         
  
   
 
 
Condition (5.6) tells us that strong asymmetry within the sub-group of strategic donors 
increases the likelihood that the equilibrium outcome is Pareto suboptimal. In effect, 
the size of the biggest, strategic donor relative to the size of the sub-group of strategic 
donors determines whether the provision is Pareto efficient or not. 
The case of DAC 
In the DAC group, the United States is the biggest, strategic donor. Consequently, the 
Pareto efficiency of the current levels of aid in the DAC group depends on whether the 
United States views full contribution as an improvement on the status quo.  
Andreas H. Hvidsten  Donor-donor games I: Pareto efficiency 
70 
 
I assume that full contribution means that all donors in the group meet the 0.7 
target. Currently, the DAC group is approximately 150 billion dollars short of full con-
tribution—all of which correspond to the sub-group of strategic donors (      ). 
The US part of the shortfall is around 70 billion dollars, i.e.,      . Hence, in order 
for the United States to gain from full contribution   
  
   
       . In contrast, if 
all strategic DAC donors were of equal size:   
 
  
       . 
Although the accuracy of these point predictions is questionable, they illustrate 
how the strong asymmetry within the strategic sub-group of DAC donors makes it less 
likely that the current provision is really Pareto suboptimal.  
 
4.4.4 Group size 
42
 
Suppose that there are     donors in a group of which   are altruistic donors, and 
the rest (   ) are strategic. We assume that all strategic donors are of equal size, 
and have the same linear payoff functions. As before, all donors face a binary choice 
of increasing their aid budget (Contribute) or not (Defect). Let    denote the utility 
function for any strategic donor  .43 We assume that the payoff for donor   is a linear 
function of the number of other donors that contribute (denoted by  ), and its own con-
tribution. Let    *   +, where to play Contribute means     , and Defect means 
    .  
 
(5.7)         (    )      
 
In (5.7),   is the cost of contributing and   is the benefit incurred by   from a contribu-
tion from any country (including itself). Certain restrictions apply to these parameters. 
First, because the good is continuous, we assume the individual payoff always increas-
es with the number of other contributors (z), that is,    .  
                                              
42 
The model I use in this section is borrowed from Scott Barrett (1998; 2003).
 
43 
I do not set up any utility function for the altruistic donors; it suffices to know that they will contribute no 
matter what. 
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Second, since   is strategic it cannot pay to be the sole contributor. Setting z to 
0, we find that this holds true if    .44 This assumption ensures that defection is the 
dominant strategy for the strategic donors, and consequently that the outcome where 
all altruistic donors contribute and all strategic donors defect is the only Nash equilib-
rium of the game. 
When is this outcome Pareto suboptimal? If only the sub-group of altruistic do-
nors contribute, the strategic donors get a payoff of   . For the outcome where all 
donors contribute to be a Pareto improvement, the following condition must hold: 
       , that is: 
 
(5.8)       
 
 
   45 
 
Restated in terms of the number of strategic and altruistic donors: 
 
(5.9)         
 
 
 
(5.10)         
 
 
 
 
From (5.8) and (5.9), we see that the size of the whole group and the size of the altruis-
tic sub-groups are intimately linked with regards to the Pareto efficiency of the out-
come. Condition (5.8) shows that the minimum number of donors in the group for the 
equilibrium outcome to be Pareto suboptimal depends on how many of them are altru-
istic. Conversely, the maximum number of altruistic donors depends on the size the 
whole group.  
Unlike   and  , the minimum number of strategic donors (for the outcome to 
be Pareto suboptimal) is unaffected by the size of the altruistic sub-group or the size of 
group as a whole. As (5.9) shows, the exact threshold depends solely on the individual 
cost-benefit ratio faced by the strategic donors. More specifically, (5.9) tells us that the 
minimum number of strategic donors needed for the equilibrium outcome to be Pareto 
                                              
44
 Proof:   (    )   (    )               Playing Defect would yield a payoff of 0 in this case, so 
Contribute must yield a payoff of less than 0, i.e.,                     
45
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suboptimal is the smallest integer greater than  
 
 
. Since    , at least two strategic 
donors are necessary, but sometimes two will not be enough. 
The case of DAC  
In the DAC-regime there are 22 donors, of which 17 are arguably strategic. Conse-
quently, for the equilibrium outcome to be suboptimal the individual cost-benefit ratio 
for the strategic donors must satisfy the following condition:  
 
 
   .  
To my knowledge, no one has undertaken a comprehensive study of the cost-
benefit ratio of meeting the 0.7 target. Therefore, it is difficult to comment on the like-
lihood of condition (5.9) being satisfied in the DAC-regime. Although 17 is a fairly 
high cost-benefit ratio, such C-B ratios are not unheard of. For instance, several cost-
benefit studies of climate change mitigation have returned C-B ratios well above 17 
(See Barrett 2003: 378 for an overview).     
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I assumed that foreign aid is a contribution to the inclusive and contin-
uous public good of eradicating poverty, and identified conditions under which the 
voluntary provision of this good is Pareto suboptimal. Specifically, I considered how 
three properties of the provision group—(i) asymmetry in interest, (ii) asymmetry in 
size and (iii) group size—must be in order for the provision to be Pareto suboptimal. 
The main findings were as follows.   
First, regarding asymmetry in interest, the proportion of altruistic donors cannot 
be too high and the altruistic donors cannot be too big for the equilibrium outcome to 
be Pareto suboptimal.
46
 Interestingly, this means that the presence of altruistic donors 
could potentially harm efforts to bring about a multilateral increase in aid levels by 
making the status quo preferable to the strategic donors of the group.  
 Second, asymmetry in size in the sub-group of strategic donors makes it more 
likely that the equilibrium outcome is Pareto suboptimal. The reason for this is that 
                                              
46
 I considered two types of donors: altruistic and strategic. The defining property of an altruistic donor is that its 
utility from adding to the public good always outweighs the potential utility of defecting. For the strategic donor, 
however, the utility of contributing to the good is outweighed by the utility of defecting once the good has been 
provided in a certain threshold amount. 
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bigger donors have a higher cost of contribution, while consuming the same amount of 
the good as smaller donors (a consequence of the good being inclusive). Thus, big do-
nors have less favorable cost-benefit ratios than smaller donors. In effect, whether the 
provision is Pareto suboptimal or not depends on the size of the biggest strategic donor 
relative to the strategic sub-group as a whole.  
Third, regarding group size, the voluntary provision of the good is Pareto 
suboptimal when (i) the group as a whole is not too small (relative to the size of the 
altruistic sub-group) (ii) the strategic sub-group is not too small, and (iii) the altruistic 
sub-group is not too big.  
 Table 4.1 summarizes the findings. 
 
Table 4.1: How the properties of the donor group must be in order for the voluntary provision 
of aid to be Pareto Suboptimal 
 Composition Asymmetry Numbers 
Whole group Not too many altruistic 
donors 
- Not too small (relative 
to the number of altru-
istic donors) 
Altruistic donors - - Not too big (relative to 
the size of the whole 
group) 
Strategic donors - Not too asymmetric Not too small 
 
4.5.1 International donor groups and Pareto inefficiency 
Throughout the discussion, I have used DAC as an example of a donor group. Howev-
er, the DAC group is not the only international donor group. I would argue that the 
European Union also qualifies as a donor group: the EU states have their own aid insti-
tutions and their own aid targets (see Table 2.2 and section 5.4.1). Table 4.2 shows the 
altruistic-strategic ratio and the asymmetry within the strategic sub-group for three 
different donor groups mentioned in this and the subsequent chapter: the DAC, EU-15 
(all pre-2004 members), and EU-12 (members that acceded in or after 2004). 
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Table 4.2: Properties of different international donor groups 
 
Table 4.2 shows that, with regards to the properties under consideration, the differ-
ences between the groups are small. First, all groups have low altruistic-strategic rati-
os. Although EU-15‘s ratio is over twice as big as the other groups‘, it is still not large. 
A low altruistic-strategic ratio makes it more likely that the status quo production is 
Pareto suboptimal.  
However, all groups are notably asymmetrical, with one big strategic donor to 
which a significant part of the current aid shortfall corresponds. This makes it less 
likely that the current production is suboptimal. Once again, EU-15 differs from the 
other two groups by being markedly more symmetrical. Overall, it is impossible to 
conclude either way regarding the Pareto efficiency of the current aid levels in any of 
the donor groups considered here. 
Group Altruistic-strategic ratio1/2 Asymmetry, strategic sub-
group3 
DAC .05 .47 
EU-15  .11 .30 
EU-12 .03 .42 
1All donors that have met the aid target set by the group qualifies as altruistic (0.7% of 
GNI for DAC and EU-15, and 0.17% for EU-12). 
2 Measured in player weights where each donor is weighed in terms of the smallest donor 
in the group (Luxembourg in DAC and EU-15, and Malta in EU-12). 
3Measured as the proportion of total aid shortfall that corresponds to the biggest strate-
gic donor (the United States in DAC, Germany in EU-15, and Poland in EU-12). 
Sources: DAC 2010b; World Bank 2010; EU 2010. 
  
Chapter 5 Donor-donor games II: Compli-
ance 
 
5.1. Purpose and plan 
In the previous chapter, I identified conditions under which the voluntary provision of 
foreign aid in a group of donors is Pareto suboptimal. In this chapter, I assume that 
these conditions hold, and that full contribution, meaning that all donors meet the 
group‘s aid target, would be a Pareto optimal outcome. The focus of this chapter is the 
design of inter-donor agreements to increase aid efforts. More precisely, I consider 
when such agreements will fail to induce compliance with aid targets.  
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I briefly consider the criteria for an 
international agreement to induce compliance (section 5.2). Then, I turn to the issue of 
enforcement. International donor regimes could potentially enforce compliance with 
aid targets in order to realize a Pareto optimal outcome. However, enforcement is only 
effective if certain criteria are met. In sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, I identify conditions 
under which different enforcement mechanisms fail to induce compliance with interna-
tional aid agreements.
 47 
 
 
5.2. Compliance and design of international agreements 
Due to the anarchic nature of the international system, agreements between states are 
always, to some degree, uncertain. In domestic affairs, a government can ensure that 
agreements are held. However, at the international level—in the absence of a world 
government and a judicial system to enforce contracts—states cannot be expected to 
follow through on commitments that are not in their interest.  
Under these circumstances, there are three possible reasons why the parties to 
an agreement may choose to comply. First, given that the other parties comply, there 
                                              
47
 In this thesis, the term ―international aid agreement‖ refers to agreements between donor countries on increas-
ing foreign aid budgets. 
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may not be any incentive to defect. Second, it may be that one or more parties have 
incentives to defect but lack the ability to do so. Finally, it may be the case that at least 
one party has both the motivation and ability to violate the agreement, but that its in-
centives to defect are checked by some kind of enforcement mechanism (Hovi 1998: 
73-74).   
 In the case of international aid agreements, the second possibility seems far-
fetched; donor states certainly have the ability to refrain from increasing their ad 
budgets. The first possibility is not unthinkable, and it would certainly be the case in a 
group of only altruistic donors. However, I will not consider this scenario any further. 
This and the coming sections will be devoted to the third possibility: that compliance 
with international aid agreements can be sustained by enforcement. 
A successful international treaty (meaning one where all participants honor their 
obligations), must meet certain criteria (Barrett 2003: xiii-xiv). First:  
 
A) It must be individually rational, which for our purpose means that no party 
can gain by failing to comply, given the treaty‘s design. 48 
 
Specified in game-theoretic terms, this criterion entails two things. First, the agreement 
must represent a Nash equilibrium, which Hovi and Areklett (2004: 5) refer to as a 
―minimal condition‖ for regime compliance. Being a Nash equilibrium may not be 
sufficient, however, when the regime relies on enforcement to sustain compliance. Af-
ter all, a Nash equilibrium may be based on empty threats of punishment. Consequent-
ly, only the subset of Nash equilibria that are subgame perfect are good candidates for 
enforced international agreements (Hovi & Areklett 2004: 7). 
 However, individual rationality is not alone sufficient when the treaty relies on 
enforcement, in which case a second criterion applies: 
  
B) It must be collectively rational, which requires that it not be possible for 
parties to gain collectively by changing the treaty (Barrett 2003: xiii). 
 
                                              
48
 It also entails that no non-party can gain by acceding or changing its behavior with regards to the issue at 
hand, given the choices of every other country. Furthermore, it means that no party can gain by withdrawing 
from the agreement, given the actions of every other country (party and non-party). 
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Criterion B) places another requirement on the equilibrium, as subgame perfection 
does not necessarily ensure collective rationality:   
 
Even if compliance is consistent with subgame perfection, it may be under-
mined by a collective incentive to renegotiate after a violation has taken 
place. It may simply be in the interest of all parties to let bygones be by-
gones, and resume cooperation without further delay (Hovi & Areklett 2004: 
10).  
 
In such situations, the threat of punishment is not credible, which in turn undercuts the 
incentives to comply in the first place. Hence, an enforced international agreement 
must be ―renegotiation proof‖ in order to uphold compliance, meaning that all parties 
cannot gain collectively from dropping the punishment after a violation has taken 
place (Hovi 2008: 89). 
 In addition to A) and B), Barrett (2003: xiv) adds a third requirement for an 
agreement to induce compliance: 
   
C) It must be ―fair‖, i.e. perceived as legitimate by the parties. 
 
According to Barrett (2003: xiv), fairness is important, as it reinforces the other re-
quirements. In the long run, he argues, only fair treaties are likely to be complied with. 
In the forthcoming analysis, I simply assume that this criterion is met. 
 To sum up, compliance with an international agreement can only be expected 
when it is in the parties‘ interest to honor their obligations. The design of the agree-
ment must reflect this fact. More specifically, it must meet the criteria of individual 
and collective rationality. In game-theoretic terms, the agreement must sustain compli-
ance as a renegotiation proof Nash equilibrium. In the following sections, I show how 
(enforced) donor agreements on raising aid levels can fail to meet these criteria, and 
thus lead to Pareto suboptimal outcomes with less than full contribution.  
 
5.2.1 Enforcement  
In the absence of a third party (e.g. a court), the enforcement of international agree-
ments must rely on self-policing by the parties. Several types of enforcement mecha-
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nisms can be evoked for this purpose. A common distinction is between internal and 
external enforcement. Internal enforcement mechanisms are those that are confined to 
the issues of the agreement at hand, while external enforcement mechanisms rely on 
measures outside of the confines of the regime. When compliance is sustained by in-
ternal enforcement mechanisms only, the agreement is said to be self-enforcing (Hovi 
1998: 81). I will primarily consider internal enforcement mechanisms, although I 
briefly look at external enforcement in section 5.5. 
A further distinction in the literature on enforcement is between decentralized 
enforcement, which is done directly by the parties themselves, and centralized en-
forcement, which is administered through institutions empowered by the parties (Hovi 
& Areklett 2004: 3). Both of these are possible options for establishing a self-
enforcing aid agreement. I consider decentralized enforcement in section 5.3, and cen-
tralized enforcement in section 5.4. 
   
5.3. Decentralized enforcement: A viable option for DAC? 
In this section, I consider a decentralized enforcement regime that relies on further 
transgression to punish non-compliance. This kind of enforcement mechanism is much 
discussed in the literature, and it is particularly interesting in this context as a possibil-
ity for sustaining compliance with the 0.7 target in the DAC regime. There are two 
reasons why decentralized enforcement of this kind could be a viable option for DAC.  
First, the DAC-regime is not very centralized. The DAC itself amounts to little 
more than an international forum for donor countries. It issues guidelines, compiles 
statistics, and reviews the members‘ performance, but its mandate does not go beyond 
making ―recommendations on matters within its competence to countries on the 
Committee‖ (DAC 2010a). To my knowledge, there have never been any serious pro-
posals to expand the powers of the DAC. Hence, responses to non-compliance based 
on centralized enforcement mechanisms seem out of the question. 
 Second, the DAC-regime is not very complex, reducing the number of possible 
sticks and carrots within the regime to ensure compliance. In fact, the only (internal) 
response to non-compliance seemingly available to the members is defection, i.e., if 
you don‘t contribute, I don‘t contribute.  
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 Can a decentralized enforcement scheme based on the threat of defection sus-
tain compliance with an international aid target? Consider a group of   donors, equal 
in all aspects, including interest.
49
 All donors must choose between Cooperate (i.e. 
increase their aid budget) and Defect (not increase their aid budget). Let   *   +, 
where to play Cooperate means     , and to play Defect means    . I assume that 
the utility for each donor is a linear function of the total number of donors that cooper-
ates.  More precisely, let    denote the utility of any donor   and be defined as:  
 
        (    )       
 
where b and c are constants and   is the number of other donors that cooperate. We 
assume that       and   
 
 
, which make the underlying game a Prisoners‘ Di-
lemma (see section 4.4.4). Assume that this game is repeated indefinitely and that fu-
ture payoffs are discounted with a factor of   (     ).50 
Barrett (2003: 280-1) has shown that decentralized enforcement based on the 
threat of defection can sustain full cooperation in a repeated PD game if the players 
agree to play the Getting Even strategy. I assume that the simplified version of Getting 
Even called Penance is used to sustain complaince.
51
 Penance prescribes that a partici-
pant country cooperates unless another party has been the sole deviator from Penance 
in the previous period, in which case Defect is played (Asheim et al. 2006: 6-7). When 
will an agreement to play Penance not be self-enforcing in this game?  
To meet the criteria of individual rationality, it cannot pay for any single donor 
to deviate from Penance under any circumstances, i.e., it must sustain cooperation as a 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. It can be shown 52 that an agreement based on 
Penance is not individually rational and will fail to induce compliance if: 
                                              
49
 For simplicity, I make the assumption that all donors are strategic. 
50
 It can be shown that a self-enforcing agreement in a PD game is only possible in games where the time hori-
zon is infinite or indefinite ((Hovi 2008: 82). In this case, I assume that the time horizon is indefinite and that the 
probability that the game goes on for another period is incorporated into the discount factor.  
51
 Although there are non-trivial differences between Penance and Getting Even, these differences do not affect 
the equilibrium path (Asheim et al. 2006: 7). 
52
 See appendix. 
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(6)          [
   (    )
(    ) (   )
 
   
(    ) (   )
] 
 
Condition (6) tells us that sustaining full compliance through retaliatory defection is 
contingent on the discount factor being relatively high.  
The discount factor is determined by two factors (Hovi 2008: 78). First, it is in-
fluenced by the discount rate: the degree to which future benefits and costs, assuming 
that they are certain, are discounted by the actors. It is difficult to assess how donors 
view future gains from giving aid. The fact that they set development goals with long 
timeframes could imply a high valuation of the future—or it could simply imply a 
wish to postpone costs. The short-term strategic use of much of foreign aid seems to 
indicate a stronger preference for immediate as supposed to long-term benefits. 
Second, the discount factor is influenced by the inherent uncertainty of the fu-
ture; there is always a risk that future benefits and costs will not materialize. With for-
eign aid, the future gains are particularly uncertain, for at least two reasons. First, due 
to the long time frame of many aid projects, conditions in the recipient country may 
change. A civil war, for instance, can instantly wipe out the gains from decades of suc-
cessful aid intervention.  
Second, since a one-size-fits-all template for development has proven elusive 
much of foreign aid is experimental in nature and the outcome can be uncertain at best. 
For instance, according to a USAID study, a big proportion of US aid to Africa is 
highly experimental and a relatively high failure rate is to be expected (Riddell 2007: 
178). The inherent uncertainty of aid giving could imply a low discount factor, which 
could be a real impediment to establishing a self-enforcing aid agreement based on 
decentralized enforcement. 
Even if the discount factor is high enough so that Penance is individually ra-
tional, the agreement may not be collectively rational, that is, able to sustain compli-
ance as a renegotiation proof equilibrium in the repeated game. The notion of renego-
tiation proofness implies that the parties cannot gain collectively by resuming coopera-
tion after a violation has taken place.  
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Obviously, the defector would prefer to resume cooperation without punish-
ment. The effective criterion is that the non-defectors cannot gain (collectively) by 
returning to cooperation instead of carrying out the punishment. This implies that the 
benefits (for the non-defectors) of carrying out the punishment must be bigger than the 
benefits of resuming cooperation immediately, i.e.,       . Plainly, if the number 
of donors ( ) is too high, a self-enforcing agreement based on Penance is not collec-
tively rational. More precisely, the following condition must hold: 
 
(7)       
 
 
   
 
Since the exact limit for  depends on the parameters c and b, it is difficult to draw 
any concrete conclusions from (7). However, as Barrett (2003: 281) points out, collec-
tive rationality clearly limits the set of viable international self-enforcing agreements.  
    In addition to the challenges captured by (6) and (7), an enforcement regime 
based on retaliatory defection is morally problematic as well. Responding to low quan-
tities of aid by lowering them even further could severely affect the global effort to 
eradicate poverty. In the end, an enforcement mechanism that punishes the poor is un-
likely to be a feasible alternative. 
To sum up, decentralized enforcement based on retaliatory defection does not 
seem like a viable option for enforcing aid targets. In part because of the inherent chal-
lenges of sustaining compliance through decentralized enforcement—captured in con-
ditions (6) and (7)—but also due to the specific characteristics of aid giving. First, the 
likelihood that donors heavily discount the future benefits of foreign aid is an impedi-
ment to this kind of enforcement regime. Second, an enforcement regime based on 
punishing the poor for the transgressions of the rich would be (highly) morally ques-
tionable.  
 
5.4. Centralized enforcement 
Although the DAC regime is highly decentralized and will likely remain so, there are 
examples of more centralized aid regimes, most notably the EU regime. Sustaining 
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compliance by means of centralized enforcement is an intuitive way of sidestepping 
some the problems identified in the previous section. However, centralized enforce-
ment is no panacea. In this section, I identify conditions under which a centralized en-
forcement fails to induce compliance with aid targets. 
 
5.4.1 EU vs. DAC 
The European Union has developed its own donor framework, including its own aid 
targets. Since the EU donor regime consists of donors who vary markedly in economic 
development, the donor group is divided in two subgroups with different aid targets.  
All the EU members that are also DAC members have committed to spend 
0.7% of GNI on ODA by 2015. In addition, these EU states have set an interim 
ODA/GNI target of 0.51%, to be reached by 2010. I will refer to this group as EU-15, 
as it consists of all 15 pre-2004 member states. The rest of the EU member states 
(those who acceded in or after 2004) have aid targets of 0.33% of GNI by 2015 and 
0.17% by 2010. I will refer to the latter group as EU-12, or new member states (NMS). 
In addition to the individual targets, the EU regime has a collective aid target of spend-
ing 0.56% of combined GNI on ODA (EU 2010: 14). 
Overall, the EU-15 donors have a decent track record of meeting their aid 
commitments. Three EU-15 states (Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands) that were 
already spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA when the target was set,
53
 have kept their aid 
levels above the target.
 
One state (Luxembourg) has joined the 0.7% group, and one 
more (Belgium) is set to join this year. Four additional states (the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Spain and Finland) are on track to reaching the interim target of 0.51% of GNI 
by 2010. However, the remaining six EU-15 states will not meet the interim target and 
will also fail, at present rates, to reach the 0.7% target by 2015 (EU 2010: 16).       
 In the EU-12 group, the picture is a bit gloomier. Although two states (Cyprus 
and Malta) are overachieving—reaching the interim 0.17% target one year early—the 
remaining ten states have some way to go, and will not reach the interim target (EU 
2010: 16-17). 
                                              
53
 In an EU context this means at the Barcelona summit in 2002. The targets were later revised in The European 
Consensus on Development (2005).   
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Difference in performance 
As a group, the EU donors are much closer to their aid targets than the DAC donors 
are. The EU states are projected to collectively spend 0.45-0.46% of GNI on ODA, in 
2010 (EU 2010: 15)—about 0.010 percentage points short of the collective target. In 
contrast, collective ODA/GNI ratio for the DAC donors is projected to be merely 
0.33% (DAC 2010b).  
 Why is the EU regime more successful in increasing aid levels than the DAC 
regime? Comparing the two regimes, one could argue that the odds are stacked in fa-
vor of the EU regime. In particular, the EU regime seems to have a more benign mix 
of donors. For instance, with four G 0.7 countries among its 15 members, the EU-15 
has a substantially higher proportion of altruistic donors than DAC (see Table 4.2). 
However, the EU regime also induces more aid efforts from its strategic donors than 
DAC does. Since over half of the EU donors are also DAC members, we can compare 
the difference in effort between EU and non-EU states within the sub-group of strate-
gic DAC donors. When crunching the numbers, an interesting pattern emerges. 
During the 1990s, the difference between the aid efforts of the (strategic) EU 
and non-EU members of DAC was infinitesimal (on average the ODA/GNI ratio for 
EU donors were 0.005 percentage points higher than for non-EU donors). When the 
inchoate EU regime forms at the start of the millennium (the first joint EU declaration 
on ODA increase is at the Barcelona summit in 2002), the difference starts to increase. 
The chart below shows the average ODA/GNI ratio for EU and non-EU DAC mem-
bers for the last decade.  
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Figure 5.1: Average ODA/GNI ratio for strategic DAC donors, 2000-09  
Source: DAC 2010b 
 
As we see from Figure 5.1, starting out nearly identical, the EU donors gradually per-
form markedly better. In 2009, European (strategic) DAC donors contributed, on aver-
age, 0.39% of GNI to ODA, while non-European strategic donors contributed, on av-
erage, 0.29% (DAC 2010b). This development implies that the EU regime is, in fact, 
more effective in inducing its members to increase aid levels, something which other 
scholars have noted as well:  
 
So far, no […] international regime exists to enforce international [aid] 
commitments that governments make. […] The only exception to this is 
emerging slowly – the commitments of the European Union. It has become 
almost an obligation of EU member states to commit to provide a certain 
amount of GNI in ODA for EU developmental activities (Stokke 2009: 
479). 
  
Difference in structure 
The main difference between the DAC and the EU regime is the degree of centraliza-
tion and complexity, both of which affect the prospect of inducing compliance with aid 
targets. The European Union remains the closest thing to a supra-national authority in 
the international system, and it permeates every political field in Europe. Consequent-
ly, the EU donors operate in a much more complex and centralized environment than 
other DAC donors do. 
According to Hovi (1998: 110-111), the ―existence of a complex network of 
treaties among a given set of countries should serve to increase the credibility of each 
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one of these treaties‖. The reason is that in such an environment the states have many 
channels through which they can react to each others‘ actions. This makes cooperative 
behavior more likely even in the absence of any enforcement mechanisms as ―[t]he 
mere knowledge that possibilities [for retaliation] exist could easily render explicit 
threats redundant‖ (Hovi 1998: 111).     
 In addition to complexity, the centralization of power could help explain the 
EU donor states‘ better record on delivering on aid commitments. In a legalized 
framework such as the European Union, enforcement can be decoupled entirely from 
the incentives of the other parties. Such a solution does, according to Hovi & Areklett 
(2004: 12), ―not only solve the problem of renegotiation. It [also solves] the credibility 
question raised by the notion of subgame perfection‖.  
However, centralized enforcement of aid targets must meet certain criteria in 
order to be effective. In the next sub-sections, I consider how a strong regime, i.e., a 
regime that can make credible threats and promises, may fail to induce compliance 
with aid targets.  
 
5.4.2 The model 
In order to be effective, centralized enforcement sustained by credible threats and 
promises must meet certain conditions. In particular, the reaction to non-compliance 
must be such that—rather than be non-compliant and have the threats effectuated or 
the promise unfulfilled—the donor prefers to comply with the regime‘s demands 
(Hovi 1998: 54).  
Consider a two-stage game with two players, the donor D and the regime R. In 
the first stage, R sets an aid target  —between 0 and 1% of GNI—for D and formu-
lates the reward for reaching the target ( ) and/or a punishment for not reaching the 
target ( ). In the second stage, D decides its aid budget, either complying with the tar-
get or not. Figure 5.2 depicts the game. 
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Formally, R will fail to induce D to comply with the aid target if: 
 
(8)              
 
which can be restated as: 
 
(8.1)              
(8.2)            
(8.3)            
 
Conditions (8.1) to (8.3) tell us that centralized enforcement of an aid target may fail 
to induce compliance if: (i) R sets the target too high, (ii) makes the reward too small 
or (iii) makes the punishment too light.  
Condition (8) does not seem like an insurmountable obstacle to effective en-
forcement of aid targets in a centralized regime such as the European Union. Yet en-
forcement mechanisms designed to induce compliance with the EU‘s aid targets are 
Donor 
Comply with target 
𝒕 
Not comply with 
target 𝒕 
 𝑝  𝑡   𝑟 
𝑡   % 
Regime 
𝑡   % 
Figure 5.2: The regime-donor game. 
Donor: 
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scarce. Moreover, in the few cases where aid contributions are, to some degree, en-
forced, the full enforcement potential is not utilized. I briefly consider two examples of 
(attempts of) centralized enforcement of aid contributions in the European Union: (i) 
when prospective member states are asked to increase their aid budgets in order to ac-
cede, and (ii) the possibility of incorporating aid contributions in the EU budget. I ar-
gue that in the first case, demands were not sufficiently clear for enforcement to be 
effective. In the second case, the (proposed) demands are not sufficiently high such 
that the outcome will likely remain Pareto suboptimal.  
  
5.4.3 When demands are unclear: The EU and the NMS 
Membership in the European Union is valuable. It provides access to the European 
common market, funding from the EU‘s structural fund, and alignment to the political 
stability of the European Union. In other words, membership in the European Union is 
a big carrot, especially for countries lacking in economic development. This gives the 
European Union leverage over prospective members, something that is exploited dur-
ing accession talks to influence policy of would-be member states. Development poli-
cy is no exception. New EU members are expected to live up to the EU aquis commu-
nautaire on development cooperation meaning, among other things, a commitment to 
increase foreign aid (Hoebink 2010: 181-182).  
Consider the case of the Czech Republic. A member of the European Union 
since 2004, it promised during accession talks to reach an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.1% by 
accession (Granell 2005: 6); and so it did. In 2004, the Czech Republic provided 
0.11% of GNI as ODA, up from 0.03% in 2000. In real terms, the Czech Republic in-
creased its ODA fourfold in preparation for accession to the European Union (DAC 
2010b).  
The same pattern is evident among other new member states (NMS). Although 
aid data is sketchy for these countries, as most of them do not follow DAC guidelines, 
the trend seems to be a rapid increase in aid efforts during the pre-accession period 
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(see Table 5.1).
54
 In light of this, it seems reasonable to assume that linkage to EU ac-
cession induced the NMS to increase their aid budgets.  
However, the promise of EU membership may not have been used to full effect 
regarding ODA levels. Specifically, the demands were not clear enough.  In order for 
a promise to be effective, it must be sufficiently clear, meaning that ―the message it 
tries to convey must be understood by the target‖ (Hovi 1998: 16). This has two as-
pects. First, it must be clear to the target what exactly the sender wants. Second, the 
target must understand what the consequences of not complying with the sender‘s de-
mands will be (Ibid.). 
 In the case under consideration, the NMS did not face any concrete aid targets 
before after accession. During the preparation period it was clear that ―the aid provid-
ed by [the NMS] is not sufficient for a EU member state‖, but at the same time ―[it 
was] not clear […] what the EU‘s Monterrey commitment on increased aid volumes 
[would] mean for new member states‖ (Granell 2005: 6). It was not until 2005—one 
year after membership had been granted—that the NMS committed to real aid quantity 
targets (0.17% by 2010 and 0.33% by 2015). An unequivocal stance on exactly what 
was demanded of the NMS with regards to ODA levels would presumably have been 
more efficient. This shows how lack of clarity can undermine the enforcement of aid 
contributions—even when the reward for compliance is great.55 
Even when used to maximum effect, linkage to accession has its clear limita-
tions when it comes to induce compliance with long-term aid targets. Plainly, once 
accession has been secured, the member states loose the incentive to increase aid ef-
forts—or even sustain the effort at current levels. Table 5.1 shows how the rapid in-
crease in ODA/DNI ratios from 2001 to 2006 for the NMS—covering the pre-
accession period—was followed by stagnation, and for some states even decline, in the 
subsequent period (2006-2009). In 2009, TRIALOG, a NGO, concluded that ―it is be-
                                              
54
 Unfortunately, I do not have data on aid levels in 2004 (the year of accession) for all NMS, so the period 
2001-2006 is a stand-in for the pre-accession period.     
55
 In addition to unclear demands, the threat of not granting accession may not have been credible in the case of 
development policy, i.e., the European Union may not have been a strong regime in this case. Development 
policy was considered one of the least important chapters in the accession talks, and ―[o]nly scant attention was 
paid to development cooperation‖ (Grimm and Harmer 2005: 11). Furthermore, most of the requirements in this 
chapter were ―soft‖, i.e., based on political rather than legal commitments (Ibid.). Overall, development policy 
was not a priority, and it was far from obvious that accession would be in jeopardy if the demands in this chapter 
were not met. 
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coming evident that the vast majority of the NMS will not make even their modest 
ODA pledges by [2010]‖ (TRIALOG 2009: 1). 
 
 
Table 5.1: ODA/GNI ratios for the NMS and change in ODA/GNI ratios in the periods 2001-
06 and 2006-09  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Granell 2000; EU 2010. 
 
5.4.4 When demands are not high enough: Budgetisation 
As argued, linking aid efforts to accession has its obvious limits. Once membership is 
secured, the incentives to keep complying with the aid target evaporate. Hence, acces-
sion linkage must be combined with other enforcement mechanisms in order to sustain 
long-term compliance with aid targets. One such mechanism that has been heavily de-
bated within the European Union is budgetisation of aid contributions from member 
states. 
 Budgetisation refers to incorporating member state contributions to EU devel-
opmental projects into the EU budget. Due to the EU budget rule of ―non-allocation‖ 
specific revenue cannot be allocated to a specific expenditure, effectively bundling the 
aid money with the other contributions to the EU system (Faria et al. 1998: 11). In ef-
fect, budgetisation would link aid contributions to continued membership in the Euro-
pean Union. 
 ODA as % of GNI Change (in %-points) 
Country 2001 2006 2009 01-06 06-09 
Poland 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.07 -0.08 
Czech Republic 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.07 0 
Slovenia 0.13 0.12 0.15 -0.01 0.03 
Slovak Republic 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.04 -0.02 
Hungary 0.04 0.13 0.09 0.09 -0.04 
Cyprus 0.02 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.02 
Lithuania 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.06 
Latvia 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.02 
Estonia 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.02 
Malta 0.01 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.05 
SUM 0.71 0.06 
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 Some aid is already financed over the EU budget, but the biggest chunk of EU 
aid, the European Development Fund (EDF), is not. As it has been since its conception 
in 1958, the EDF is funded by voluntary contributions from member states. The exact 
amount and the financial burden-sharing are the result of inter-governmental negotia-
tion (Grimm 2006: 4). It should come as no surprise at this point that ―the actual deliv-
ery of aid […] has been consistently below commitments‖ (EU 2003: 14). 
 If budgetisation of all EU aid were to become a reality, it would no doubt be an 
effective coercion mechanism. In addition to being severe (as an ultimate consequence 
EU membership is at stake) and credible, it would also be clear and complete with un-
ambiguous demands placed on each member state.
56
 Budgetisation would, in effect, 
make contributions to EU development projects mandatory in the sense that ―Member 
States cannot opt out nor reduce their contribution‖ (Faria et al. 1998: 17). 
 However, EU aid is only one part of total aid spending by EU donors. Thus, 
total aid levels could not be expected to increase. Strategic donors could simply reduce 
their other aid expenditures under such a scheme, keeping the size of their aid budget 
constant. This illustrates the limits of making some aid spending mandatory; it only 
sets a floor below which aid budgets cannot drop. If this floor does not equal the aid 
target, the situation is likely to remain Pareto suboptimal.
57
  
 
5.5. A note on external enforcement 
So far in this chapter, I have reviewed the difficulties of establishing self-enforcing 
inter-donor aid agreements. It may very well be that creating a self-enforcing aid 
agreement is not feasible. If not, one may have to look outside the regime for enforce-
ment options: 
 
If the parties to a given agreement suspect – or even know – that it will not 
be self-enforcing, it is important that they are able to invoke other mecha-
nisms which can make their commitments credible (Hovi 1998: 103).  
 
                                              
56
 The contribution of any member state would be calculated on the basis of GNP (Farias et al. 1998: 11). 
57
 However, the fact that the member states have blocked budgetisation (Grimm 2006: 4) raises the question of 
whether they really view the current situation as suboptimal.   
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How can donor states increase the credibility of their aid commitments? Within the 
European Union, the EU Commission has been preoccupied with this question: 
 
[T]he EU now needs to demonstrate how to get back on-track to reach the 
0.7% ODA/GNI target and to prepare a credible pathway for bridging the 
gap to meeting the 2015 deadline (EU 2010: 18, emphasis added). 
  
In its report before the latest EU Council meeting on the MDGs (in june 2010), the EU 
Commission recommended several actions to demonstrate the EU‘s resolve. First, all 
member states should publish national action plans where they reconfirm the aid target 
and establish a realistic and verifiable plan for reaching it. Second, an internal ―ODA 
peer review‖ process should be created to monitor the progress of each member state 
and make recommendations for improved performance (much like the DAC peer re-
view process). Finally, member states should consider ―self-binding‖ political and le-
gal mechanisms like ring-fencing ODA goals
58
 or enacting national legislation on 
ODA levels (EU 2010: 18-19). The EU council, however, did not acquiesce to the 
Commission‘s recommendations and made no mention of national action plans, inter-
nal ODA review, or self-binding mechanisms in their conclusions (Concord 2010b).   
In the absence of a centrally coordinated effort, some donors have taken private 
initiatives to demonstrate commitment to their aid targets. Belgium has made reaching 
the 0.7% target by 2015 a national law, although no conditions are set on annual in-
crease. In the UK, a similar proposal to make spending at least 0.7% of GNI on ODA 
from 2013 mandatory is currently being examined by the British parliament. Both Ire-
land and Sweden have enshrined national ODA targets in their annual budget law. In 
addition, several EU states are developing politically binding multi-year plans to reach 
their aid targets (EU 2010: 17-18).  
These efforts are probably too fragmented to make up for the lack of other ef-
fective enforcement mechanisms. However, they illustrate an increasing willingness 
on the part of donor countries to increase the credibility of their aid commitments. The 
result will surely be more aid, even if total aid levels remain Pareto suboptimal.  
 
                                              
58
 Ring-fencing is a promise not to make cuts in a certain part of a budget. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
When the voluntary provision of aid is Pareto suboptimal, enforcing aid contributions 
could potentially realize a Pareto optimal outcome. In this chapter, I considered how 
the legal and political framework in which donor countries operate may fail to sustain 
compliance with aid targets—and keep aid levels Pareto suboptimal.  More precisely, I 
looked at how failure to meet the criteria of collective and individual rationality can 
impede the establishment of self-enforcing aid agreements. The findings can be sum-
marized as follows.  
First, a decentralized enforcement regime based on retaliatory defection as pun-
ishment will unlikely be a feasible option for international donor regimes; in part be-
cause the discount factor is likely to be small, but also due to moral concerns. I did not  
considered other forms of decentralized enforcement. 
Second, a centralized, complex regime will likely be more effective in inducing 
compliance than a decentralized regime—as implied by the better performance by EU 
donors compared with other DAC donors. It is reasonable to assume that at least some 
of the difference in performance is due to the centralized enforcement mechanisms 
found within the EU regime. However, I concluded that the enforcement potential of 
the European Union is not used to full effect when it comes to sustain compliance with 
aid targets. 
Finally, in the absence of self-enforcing aid agreements, external enforcement 
mechanisms may be evoked to sustain compliance. More specifically, donors can in-
crease the credibility of their aid commitments by, for instance, enshrining them in 
national legislation or binding their hands politically by ring-fencing aid budgets. 
Some donors have taken this course of action, but currently these efforts seem too 
fragmented to help sustain compliance with international aid goals.  
Table 5.2 (next page) provides an overview of the situations examined in this 
chapter. 
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Table 5.2: Situations where the quantity of aid remains Pareto sub-optimal 
 
  
Basic condi-
tion 
Situation Outcome Case 
The voluntary 
provision of aid 
is Pareto subop-
timal 
No enforcement All altruistic 
donors contrib-
ute while all 
strategic donors 
defect 
DAC 
Decentralized enforcement where 
conditions (6) or (7) is satisfied 
All strategic do-
nors defect 
Hypothetical 
Centralized en-
forcement 
The reaction to 
non-compliance 
satisfies condi-
tion (8)  
The donor pre-
fers not to com-
ply with the aid 
target 
Hypothetical 
Linking compli-
ance to acces-
sion, demands 
are not clearly 
stated 
Some increase 
in aid efforts up 
until accession, 
then aid levels 
stagnates or 
declines 
EU and the NMS 
Including only a 
proportion of 
ODA in the re-
gime budget 
All strategic do-
nors adjust their 
non-regime aid 
so that overall 
aid efforts re-
main the same  
Hypothetical, 
but based on 
issue of 
budgetisation of 
EDF funds. 
Fragmented external enforcement More aid is giv-
en, but the situ-
ation will likely 
remain Pareto 
suboptimal 
EU 
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5.7. Appendix 
5.7.1 Conditions for Penance to be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
Penance is a Nash equilibrium in the repeated game only if it does not pay to defect for 
one period and then return to compliance (given that the other players play Penance). 
Therefore the utility of compliance in both periods must outweigh the utility of defec-
tion in period   and returning to compliance in    , i.e.       (    )  
    (   ). Solving for   gives: 
 
  
   (    )
(    )  (   )
 
 
For Penance to be subgame perfect it must prescribe equilibrium behavior also in the 
case of violation by one of the parties. Assume that state   deviated in the previous 
round, in which case Penance prescribes that   play Cooperate while everyone else 
plays Defect in period   and a return to full cooperation in    . Obviously, deviating 
from Penance is not rational for any other donor than   since it would loose the gain of 
  (    ) in period t and, in addition, be punished in    . For donor   it pays to 
accept the punishment and return to cooperation if      (    )    
 (   ), i.e. if: 
 
  
   
(    )  (   )
 
 
Consequently, the strategy profile where all donors play Penance is not a subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium if: 
 
      [
   (    )
(    )  (   )
 
   
(    )  (   )
] 
 Chapter 6 Summary 
 
Why do donor countries not fulfill their aid promises? In this thesis, I have looked at 
one possible answer, namely that donor countries want to honor their aid commitments 
but that circumstances pertaining to their strategic environment check their incentives 
to do so. The research question was as follows: 
 
How can the current situation with lower-than-promised levels of aid be unsatisfactory 
for donor countries? 
 
To investigate this question in a systematic fashion, I set up formal models of interac-
tions and used game theory to find the conditions for certain outcomes to materialize. 
Specifically, I looked for outcomes where a donor would prefer an alternative outcome 
where more aid is given. I considered two types of games: donor-recipient games and 
donor-donor games. 
 
6.1. Donor-recipient games 
Regarding donor-recipient interaction, the main mechanism that may lead a donor to 
give less aid than it would ideally prefer can be summarized as follows: 
 
(1) A donor may want to give, but only on the condition of certain behavior on the 
part of the recipient. If the donor knows, believes or experiences that the recipi-
ent will or does not conform to this behavior the outcome could be that the do-
nor restricts aid, even though it would ideally prefer to give more. 
 
Mechanism (1) is well established as an impediment to aid flows. In the literature, the 
focus has mostly been on conditionality failure, i.e., when aid is withdrawn because of 
failure on the part of the recipient to meet certain demands. In chapter 3, I argued that, 
under such circumstances, the donor might prefer that the recipient had complied with 
the donors‘ demands and that aid had continued to flow.  
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However, mechanism (1) goes beyond the issue of conditionality. General dis-
trust between a donor and a recipient can stop the process at an even earlier stage. If a 
donor believes that a prospective recipient is unlikely to comply with the donor‘s 
wishes, the donor might abstain from entering into a bilateral aid agreement in the first 
place, even if it would (ideally) prefer to do so. 
   
6.2. Donor-donor games 
Regarding donor-donor interaction, the main mechanism can be summarized as fol-
lows: 
 
(2) Donors may see foreign aid as a contribution to an international public good 
and be tempted to free ride on the efforts of each other. If the properties of the 
good and the providing group are such that the voluntary production is Pareto 
inefficient and effective enforcement mechanism to induce increased efforts are 
absent, the resulting quantity of aid is Pareto suboptimal. 
 
Mechanism (2) represents a novel way of looking at multilateral commitments to in-
crease aid spending, such as the 0.7 target. My discussion of (2) had two parts. First, in 
chapter 4, I found the conditions for the voluntary provision of foreign aid to be Pareto 
suboptimal. More specifically, I looked at how properties of the donor group influence 
the Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium outcome. I found that the provision of aid is 
Pareto suboptimal when (i) the group is sufficiently big, (ii) the proportion and size of 
altruistic donors is small, and (iii) the sub-group of strategic donors is not too asym-
metric in economic size.
59
   
Second, in chapter 5, I looked at how an international aid agreement between 
donors on increasing aid efforts could fail to induce compliance, and thus fail to real-
ize a Pareto optimal outcome. I did not consider a saturated list of possible treaty de-
signs, but concentrated on two possibilities: (i) an agreement based on decentralized 
enforcement where violations are punished with further violations, and (ii) an agree-
                                              
59
 The defining property of an altruistic donor is that its utility from adding to the public good always outweighs 
the potential utility of defecting. For the strategic donor, however, the utility of contributing to the good is out-
weighed by the utility of defecting once the good has been provided in a certain threshold amount. 
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ment based on centralized enforcement where compliance is sustained by rewards and 
punishments by a regime.  
I concluded that decentralized enforcement based on retaliatory defection is 
probably not a feasible option for donor regimes, but that a centralized enforcement 
scheme could potentially induce compliance in such a regime. However, in the central-
ized regime I considered, the European Union, aid targets are not enforced efficient-
ly—if at all. I also briefly considered the possibility of evoking external enforcement 
mechanisms. I found such mechanisms unlikely to sustain a Pareto optimal outcome as 
long as they are employed in a fragmented way, as currently is the case.  
 
6.3. Conclusion   
To what extent do the mechanisms identified in this thesis explain why donor coun-
tries do not deliver on their aid promises? Throughout the discussion, I have provided 
examples and anecdotal empirical support showing that these mechanisms are, at least, 
part of the explanation. Rather than giving a full account of donor stinginess, the most 
important contribution of this thesis is the systematic examination of an argument 
about donor behavior that has—to my knowledge—not been considered explicitly be-
fore.  
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